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PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS:
TO JUNK OR NOT TO JUNK?
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN"
INTRODUCTION
If nothing else, the interaction between the criminal court-
room and the mental health profession has produced some mem-
orable nomenclature. "The abuse excuse,"' "battered woman
syndrome,"2 "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,"'
"false memory syndrome,"4 "television intoxication,"5 "urban
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Law, University of Florida College of Law. I would like to thank Andrew Taslitz,
Mark Fondacaro, the participants at the Mental Health Law Conference sponsored
by the University of Virginia's Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy in
October, 1997, and the participants at a workshop at the University of Florida Col-
lege of Law for their comments on earlier versions of this Article. I would also like
to thank Marilyn Moran and Melissa Moore for their research assistance.
1. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITz, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP OUTS, SOB
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
2. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
3. See, e.g., David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complain-
ants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Psycholog-
ical Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Jacqueline Hough, Note, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual
Abuse: Applying the Daubert Standard in State Courts, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 855, 864
(1996) (noting that proponents of false memory syndrome "suggest that internal and
external forces may be responsible for creating false memories").
5. See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon The
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survival syndrome,"6  '=Y chromosome abnormality"7-these
are just a few of the colorful appellations used to describe claims
that mental health professionals have bolstered with their testi-
mony over the years.' From reading the popular press, one
could easily come to the conclusion that such testimony is spuri-
ous "psychobabble" that will eventually swallow up our justice
system? Even a more tempered observer is likely to wonder
whether this type of opinion evidence is worthy of consideration
in courts of law. That is the primary question this Article seeks
to address."°
Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and
Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731 (1996).
6. See, e.g., id.; Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials
and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free
Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1988); Maureen P. Coffey, Note, The
Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation?, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 353 (1993).
8. For a much longer list, see DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at 18-19 (including
"adopted child syndrome," "American dream syndrome," "black rage syndrome," "com-
puter addiction," "fetal alcohol syndrome," "premenstrual stress syndrome," "self-vic-
timization syndrome," and "UFO survivor syndrome"). It should be noted, however,
that not all of these have been used in criminal trials.
9. See Lori Montgomery, Teen Killer Blames Fear of Other Blacks: His Survival
Defense Troubles Neighbors as Well as Legal Experts, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 22,
1994, at 1A; Niko Price, The 'Abuse Excuse":• Threat to Justice?; More and More
Lawyers Using Trauma as Defense to Crimes, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1994,
at 3 (referring to "two decades of pop psychology and afternoon talk shows that have
convinced society . . .that there is an explanation-and possibly a justification-for
almost any act"); Nightline: Is Abuse an Excuse? (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 4,
1994); cf. Margot Slade, I am a Victim of (Fill in Blank) and Couldn't Help Myself-
Legal Defenses Put Blame on Syndromes, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL), May
21, 1994, at 4A, available in 1994 VL 8438344 (discussing notable uses of various
syndromes).
10. Others have addressed the issue of whether these various defenses will signifi-
cantly undermine the retributive and deterrent objectives of the law. In a word,
their answer is no. See Peter Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?
19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 703, 703-05, 709 (1996) (noting that successful "abuse
excuses" are very rare and that typically only those claiming insanity are eligible to
be excused under abuse excuse theories); Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing
in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 1, 3-4, 15
(1995) (describing the lack of success of novel psychiatric defenses in a number of
cases and arguing that public attitudes toward those with mental problems have
hardened); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines: Has a Talk-Show Mentality Softened
Jurors to Accept any Excuse?, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 40, 42 (indicating that such
defenses are usually unsuccessful).
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This Article begins, in Part I, with a brief review of the past
four decades" of psychiatric and psychological testimony in
criminal trials (henceforth referred to simply as "psychiatric tes-
timony"). Although this review cannot be called comprehen-
sive, 2 it does make clear that, contrary to what the popular lit-
erature would have us believe, psychiatric innovation is neither
at an all time high nor the prevalent form of opinion testimony
by mental health professionals. At the same time, such "nontra-
ditional" expert opinion from clinicians, on those rare occasions
when it does occur, has changed over the past few decades in
both content and objective.
Part II canvasses historical developments in the law govern-
ing the admissibility of psychiatric testimony With the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, this law has undergone a metamorphosis, at least
on the surface. What is also clear, however, is that evidentiary
changes have not, to date, affected the admissibility of most
psychiatric testimony. Traditional psychiatric testimony contin-
ues to be admitted regardless of its reliability. Further, while
novel psychiatric testimony is usually subjected to Daubert-type
or other screening tests, the continuing ambiguity of these tests
means that nontraditional evidence is still admitted, excluded,
or limited in its scope for reasons that are not always immedi-
ately apparent. A better method of parsing out truly "junk" testi-
mony is needed.
Part III offers ways of improving the evidentiary analysis. A
good framework for such analysis already exists-under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the admissibility of any expert testimony
hinges on its materiality, probative value, helpfulness, and un-
derstandability.'4 Most courts, however, perhaps not attuned to
11. This review only goes back 40 years because, prior to the 1950s, appellate
cases dealing with the admissibility of psychological testimony were few and far
between.
12. This Article's claims about the content and focus of psychiatric testimony stem
primarily from analysis of appellate cases, law review articles, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, from talking to mental health professionals "in the trenches." Although it accu-
rately reports what these sources provide, this Article does not necessarily reflect
the entire story unfolding in trial courts around the country because many cases are
not appealed and because there are many different "trenches."
13. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
14. See generally Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"?
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the subtly different versions of behavioral "science," could bene-
fit from an elaboration of this framework as it applies to psychi-
atric testimony.
The most important contention in Part III concerns the as-
sessment of probative value. The thesis here is that a distinction
should be made between psychiatric evidence presented to prove
past mental state and psychiatric evidence proffered to prove
acts. Given the difficulty, in theory and in practice, of proving
past mental state,15 the reliability assessment that is part of
gauging probative value should be less demanding for psychiat-
ric evidence on this issue. At the same time, psychiatric testimo-
ny that focuses on whether an act occurred-an objective and
scientifically verifiable fact-should have to meet a more strin-
gent test. In short, assessment of probative value should take
into account the extent to which accuracy is possible.
Part III also makes suggestions aimed at improving analysis
of the other three components of the admissibility framework:
materiality, helpfulness, .and countervailing factors. First, courts
should pay much closer attention to the substantive scope of the
law governing mental state defenses, a move that should curtail
some of the more outlandish claims. At the same time, the law
should define the helpfulness inquiry in broad terms, focusing
on the extent to which psychiatric evidence offers
counterintuitive explanations. Finally, courts must consider
whether the evidence will be subject to adversarial testing, given
the importance of ensuring the evidence is understood for its
actual worth.
Part IV concludes the Article with a discussion of an interest-
ing implication of the foregoing arguments: the ultimate impact
of the proposed framework is to allow criminal defendants more
leeway than the government in presenting psychiatric evidence.
Part IV briefly presents two normative justifications for this out-
come, the first derived from the constitutional right to present a
defense and the second based on utilitarian concerns about what
Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and
703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 354-58 (1992) (discussing two of the Federal Rules of
Evidence governing expert testimony).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 162-87.
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would happen if that right were seriously abridged. Taken to-
gether, the arguments made in this Article suggest that suspect
psychiatric science has a role to play in the criminal courtroom,
but normally only when it supports claims concerning the past
mental state of a defendant.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY
Any attempt to assess the admissibility of psychiatric evidence
must begin with some understanding of its nature and scope. It
also should be informed by some knowledge of the wide range
of legal issues such evidence might purport to address. The fol-
lowing discussion examines these two topics from an historical
perspective.
A. Types of Psychiatric Testimony
Psychiatric testimony comes in all shapes and sizes. Particu-
larly conspicuous these days is so-called "syndrome testimony."
For instance, the battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes the
state of "learned helplessness" allegedly visited on women who
suffer through cyclical battering from their spouse or significant
other. 6 It has been used to support a defense of insanity, prov-
ocation, or self-defense." The child sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome (CSAAS)'" and the rape trauma syndrome
16. The initial, although not the most coherent, description of the syndrome is
found in WALKER, supra note 2. See also Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's
Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1197 (1993) (noting traditional view of "learned helplessness"
as an element of BWS).
17. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996) (examining BWS in self-
defense context); State v. McClain, 591 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
(examining adequate provocation); State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339 (Ohio 1997)
(examining BWS in self-defense context); State v. Whitney-Biggs, 936 P.2d 1047 (Or.
Ct. App. 1997) (examining extreme emotional disturbance relevant to manslaughter).
See generally Susan Murphy, Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victimization: Ex-
pert Psychological Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syn-
drome, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 277 (1992) (examining use of BWS testimony
to support claims of insanity or self-defense).
18. See generally Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983) (providing the first explicit treatment
of CSAAS).
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(RTS) 19 purport to identify psychological symptoms experienced
by people who have been subjected to sexual abuse, and are re-
lied upon by prosecutors to bolster testimony by victims whose
injuries are otherwise hard to discern."0 The "Vietnam veteran
syndrome," like the three syndromes just discussed, is an appli-
cation of the post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis, this time
to those who experienced the trauma of war.2' It is usually in-
troduced in insanity cases to support the argument that the
defendant experienced a "flashback" to his war days at the time
of the crime.22
Other types of syndrome testimony are less common, but no
less familiar to those who peruse the media. "Urban survival
syndrome," which posits that black ghetto youth are also in a
Cwar zone"--an urban one that makes them particularly fearful
of other black youths-recently received considerable publicity
even though it has been advanced in only one case to date." Al-
so rare, but particularly controversial, are prosecutions for de-
cades-old child abuse24 bolstered by psychiatric evidence that
people can repress memories and then "discover" them years
19. See generally Ann Wolbert Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974) (providing the first scholarly article on
RTS).
20. See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psycho-
logical Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2027,
2040-44 (1994) (discussing cases in which testimony based on CSAAS has been ad-
mitted); Karla Fischer, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 710-26 (outlining
admissibility of RTS evidence in various contexts).
21. See generally Chaim Shatan, Soldiers in and After Vietnam, 31 J. SOC. SCI. 25
(1975) (describing the existence of a delayed reaction to the stress of combat during
the Vietnam War); Chaim Shatan, The Grief of Soldiers-The Vietnam Combat
Veterans' Self-Help Movement, 43 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 640 (1973) (same).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1983); State v.
Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982); State v. Coogan, 453 N.W.2d 186 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990).
23. See Wally Owens, Casenote, State v. Osby, The Urban Survival Defense, 22
AM. J. CRim. L. 809 (1995); see also Montgomery, supra note 9, at 1A (reporting use
of urban survival syndrome defense in the Osby case).
24. See, e.g., State v. Hungerford, No. 94-S-045 et al., 1995 WL 378571 (N.H. Su-
per. Ct. May 23, 1995), affd, 697 A.2d 916 (N.H. 1997); Commonwealth v. Crawford,
682 A.2d 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), appeal granted, 693 A.2d 965 (Pa. 1997).
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later;' these claims may be rebutted by what has been called
the "false memory syndrome."26
With such a wide array of new and sometimes bizarre-sound-
ing psychiatric claims finding their way into criminal trials, it is
no wonder that many commentators charge that modern-day
psychiatric testimony often appears to be made-to-order junk
science unfit for a court proceeding. 7 Part III of this Article ad-
dresses the legal ramifications of these challenges. For now, a
few observations about the nature of psychiatric testimony will
help to put them in perspective.
First, and most importantly, the bulk of criminal trials in
which mental health professionals testify do not involve any of
these dramatic claims. Rather, the typical expert psychiatric
opinion is rather humdrum, usually concerning whether the de-
fendant was evidencing symptoms of schizophrenia, manic-de-
pressive psychosis, antisocial personality, schizoid personality, or
some other traditional diagnosis.' The battles of the experts, if
25. The term "repression," when used to mean the act of "keeping something out
of consciousness," was popularized by Sigmund Freud. See Matthew Hugh Erdelyi &
Benjamin Goldberg, Let's Not Sweep Repression Under the Rug: Toward a Cognitive
Psychology of Repression, in FUNCTIONAL DISORDERS OF MEMORY 355, 360 (John F.
Kihlstrom & Frederick J. Evans eds., 1979), cited in Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth
F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution about Tolling the Statute of
Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 134
n.16 (1993). Almost every state has enacted statutes that toll or extend the statute
of limitations in cases where "memory" of childhood sexual abuse becomes "unre-
pressed" years after it occurred. See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra, at 150-53.
26. False memory syndrome "refers to a condition in which the victim's personality
or identity and interpersonal relationships revolve around a traumatic memory which
is objectively false, but in which the person strongly believes." Douglas R. Richmond,
Bad Science: Repressed and Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 44 U.
KAN. L. REV. 517, 521 (1996).
27. See, e.g., LEE COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR: PSYCHIATRY, AUTHORITY, AND
LAW ix (1984) (arguing that psychiatrists "have no valid scientific tools or expertise
to justify their legal power"); MARGARET A. HAGEN, WHORES OF THE COURT: THE
FRAUD OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY AND THE RAPE OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (1997) (ar-
guing that psychiatric testimony should be banned from the courtroom because it is
based on subjective opinions, intuition, and "junk science"); see also DERSHOWITZ, su-
pra note 1, at 38 (labeling "much" of the new psychiatric knowledge "psychobabble"
and warning that "we must not be seduced by the jargon of experts, particularly
'experts' who are really advocates for a particular political position or worldview").
28. See RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS (3d ed. forthcoming 1998) (reporting transcript of insanity
trial of John Hinckley illustrating experts' disagreements over whether Hinckley was
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1
they occur at all, are over whether the defendant fits into di-
agnostic categories that have been well-established for de-
cades.29 Rare is the forensic professional who has ever offered
syndrome or other "novel" opinion testimony."
A related observation is that, contrary to the innuendo of the
anti-junk science literature and the press, psychiatric innovation
in criminal cases is not at an all-time high. Twenty years ago,
the psycho-legal landscape was no less dotted with gaudy claims.
In the 1970s, defendants based exculpatory defenses on "televi-
sion intoxication,"3  cultural upbringing, 2  "brainwashing,"33
f"rotten social background,"34 and the possession of an extra Y
chromosome. 5 Going back even further, a number of criminal
suffering from some type of psychosis or merely a personality disorder); see also
Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving testimony support-
ing a claim of schizophrenia); People v. Medina, 906 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1995) (involving
testimony concerning psychotic disorder, most likely schizophrenia), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 151 (1996); Van Poyck v. State, 694 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1997) (involving testimo-
ny relating to schizo-affective disorder), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 559 (1997).
29. Supporting this point with case law is difficult because so few psychiatric cas-
es are appealed. See supra note 12. It can, however, be supported indirectly. For ex-
ample, virtually everyone who is hospitalized after being found not guilty by reason
of insanity is categorized according to a standard diagnosis listed in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See
GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 216-17 (1987).
30. For instance, only a handful of the veteran forensic mental health experts that
I have trained in Florida, Virginia, and elsewhere over the past 18 years have given
such testimony.
31. See Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (discuss-
ing admissibility of psychological testimony on "involuntary subliminal television in-
toxication" in the context of an insanity defense).
32. See People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (discussing
admissibility of anthropological testimony on relationships in India in the context of
a diminished capacity defense), rev'd, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974).
33. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 889, 891 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (discuss-
ing expert testimony about whether treatment of the defendant by her captors "de-
prived her of the requisite general intent to commit the offense charged"), affd, 563
F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977).
34. See United States v. Alexander 471 F.2d 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discuss-
ing "rotten social background" as a defense).
35. See, e.g., People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Millard v.
State, 261 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). See gen-
erally Lawrence B. Kessler, Note, The XYY Chromosomal Abnormality: Use and Mis-
use in the Legal Process, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469 (1972) (describing research into
"the XYY anomaly" and its correlation to socially deviant behavior).
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defendants in the 1960s relied on claims of multiple personality
disorder,36 "psychic disintegration,"" and other manifestations
of the unconscious."8
At the same time, the nature of nontraditional testimony does
seem to have changed at the margins over the past few decades
in at least three ways. First, such testimony is more likely to be
explicitly nomothetic, as opposed to idiopathic, in nature. In-
stead of individualized descriptions based on an intimate inter-
view with the subject of the testimony, which was the usual fare
twenty-five years ago, the newer brand of nontraditional evi-
dence tends to rely on off-the-rack data or impressions about a
group of people, presented by an expert who may never have
seen the defendant or witness to whom it is applied."9 John
Monahan and Larry Walker have called this type of testimony
"social framework evidence,"4" because it provides only back-
ground information that must then be tied into the case at hand
by other submissions. For instance, framework testimony in a
child abuse case might describe the typical psychological charac-
teristics of a victim of child abuse. Other evidence is then need-
ed to link those characteristics with the child in question. All
psychiatric testimony fits this pattern to some extent; for in-
36. See CAROLYN ANSPACHER, THE TRIAL OF DR. DEKAPLANY 115 (1965) (describing
the defendant as having two personalities, one courageous and gentle, the other
cowardly, brutal, and sadistic).
37. See People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492, 496 (Cal. 1959) (involving psychiatric
testimony that stated that "for this man to go insane, means to be permanently...
under the influence of the devil.... [An individual in this state of crisis will do
anything to avoid the threatened insanity.").
38. See United States v. Pollard, 282 F.2d 450, 460-64 (6th Cir.) (discussing psy-
chiatric testimony to the effect that the defendant committed the crime as a result
of an unconscious need for punishment), mandate clarified, 285 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1960); United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 489-94 (A.C.M.R. 1954) (addressing
claim based on "induced political psychosis"), aft'd, 22 C.M.R. 144 (C.M.A. 1956).
39. In 1987, for instance, Professors Walker and Monahan noted that "[w]ithin the
past several years . . . courts have increasingly begun to use [general research of
the type described in the text] .... Notable examples can be found in cases con-
cerning eyewitness identification, assessments of dangerousness, battered women, and
sexual victimization." Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New
Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 563 (1987).
40. Id. at 560 (defining "social framework" as the use of "general conclusions from
social science research in determining factual issues in a specific case").
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stance, even traditional testimony that the defendant was hear-
ing voices at the time of the offense is usually bolstered by refer-
ences to the typical symptoms of schizophrenia.4 1 The new syn-
drome testimony, however, is more explicit about focusing on
"group character,"42 as opposed to the character of the subject.
A closely related difference between the recent and more dis-
tant past is that today's nontraditional testimony is more likely
to be presented in a self-consciously scientific style. This is not
to say that today's testimony is necessarily based on better sci-
ence, just that it is more commonly framed in scientific terms.
For instance, experts who testify about BWS or RTS often talk
about studies purporting to show specific symptoms to be se-
quelae of battering and rape.41 In contrast, testimony of yester-
year about unconscious conflicts, brainwashing, and rotten social
background, as well as unusual defenses of the early 1980s, such
as pathological gambling" and premenstrual syndrome,45 rare-
ly referred to concerted scientific research; instead, the usual
basis of the opinion was experience and theory.4"
41. See, e.g., United States v. Evanoff, 10 F.3d 559, 563 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting
expert testimony that behavior of a defendant who "hears voices" is consistent with
schizophrenic mental disorder).
42. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psycho-
logical Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 25-29 (1993) (containing one of the
first uses of the label "group character").
43. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 631-39 (D.C. 1979) (describing
testimony by Dr. Lenore Walker about her research concerning battered women);
People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 133-35 (N.Y. 1990) (discussing studies concerning
RTS); see also Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 287-290 (D. Mass. 1996) (dis-
cussing Dr. Bessel van der Kolk's testimony describing "several studies which fo-
cused on the concept of repressed memories").
44. See United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting "re-
cent" recognition of pathological gambling as a disease); United States v. Shorter,
618 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1985), affd, 809 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing "the
impact of pathological gambling disorder on the volitional faculties").
45. See generally Robert Mark Carney & Brian D. Williams, Recent Decision, Pre-
menstrual Syndrome, A Criminal Defense, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 (1983) (ex-
amining People v. Santos, No. 1K046229 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Nov. 3, 1982), and the va-
lidity of PMS as a criminal defense).
46. See United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990) (allowing expert to
testify based on professional experience, without using special techniques or models);
Lewellyn, 723 F.2d at 619 (discussing expert's basis as "experience with pathological
gamblers"); Santos, No. 1K046229 (discussing expert who had worked with women
who were violent prior to menstruation).
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A third difference between psychiatric testimony today and
that of a quarter century ago or even that of fifteen years ago is
that more of it departs from the medical model of mental dis-
ability. Psychodynamic testimony and claims about extra Y chro-
mosomes, premenstrual conditions, or pathological gambling at-
tribute mental problems primarily to biological or intrapsychic
causes.' In contrast, claims based on urban psychosis, war-in-
duced trauma, or cultural differences (the latter of which have
become much more frequent in the 1980s and 1990s) place pri-
mary blame for mental disturbances on the environment.48 The
"abuse excuse," a label encompassing a wide array of claims to
the effect that previous abuse caused particular criminal behav-
ior,49 also focuses on exogenous etiological factors. 0
Not too much should be made of these tendencies regarding
psychiatric evidence at criminal trials. Certainly some nontradi-
tional psychiatric testimony from the 1970s was nomothetic and
explicitly research-based (e.g., concerning the effects of watching
television)," and some of the specific claims made in that de-
cade focused on environmental causes (e.g., television intoxica-
tion, rotten social background, and brainwashing testimony).52
47. See Lewellyn, 723 F.2d at 617-20 (discussing inability of pathological gambler
to resist impulses to gamble); Santos, No. 1K046229 (involving argument by defen-
dant that she "blacked out" as a result of PMS); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313,
319-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (examining evidence of XYY syndrome as biological
cause of deviant behavior).
48. See, e.g., Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 480-82 (9th Cir.
1991) (discussing expert testimony regarding defendant's cultural background); State
v. Coogan, 453 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (involving claim by defendant
that, at the time of the killings, he "believed he was in a combat situation in Viet-
nam"); Owens, supra note 23, at 810 (noting claim by defendant that, because of his
upbringing in a violent, urban environment, he believed his only option was to kill
his two victims).
49. See generally DERSHOWrrz, supra note 1, at 3 (defining the "abuse excuse" as
"the legal tactic by which criminal defendants claim history of abuse as an excuse
for violent retaliation").
50. See id. at 19 (noting that each of the various "abuse excuse" claims shares in
common "a goal of deflecting responsibility from the person who committed the crim-
inal act onto someone else who may have abused him or her or otherwise caused
him or her to do it").
51. See Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (involving re-
search based testimony on the effects of television violence on children).
52. See Zamora, 361 So. 2d at 779-81 (examining psychological testimony on
"television intoxication"); United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1
Nonetheless, these three mini-trends are worth noting; as devel-
oped below, they may bear some relationship to judicial analysis
of psychiatric evidence.
B. The Legal Focus of Psychiatric Testimony
Psychiatric testimony has changed not only in content but
also in purpose. In the "old" days, such testimony was offered
almost entirely in support of an insanity defense, with occasion-
al attempts to prove lack of mens rea (the latter sometimes re-
ferred to as "diminished capacity")." Today, psychiatric testi-
mony is used to ground self-defense,' provocation," duress, 6
and entrapment57 claims, as well as insanity and absence-of-
mens rea arguments."
(involving rotten social background); United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.
Cal. 1975) (involving "brainwashing" defense).
53. Professor Lewin's 1975 article, focusing on psychiatric evidence presented in
criminal trials for purposes other than insanity, discussed only diminished capacity
cases. See Travis H.D. Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes
Other than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Shepard v. State, 847 P.2d 75 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
post-traumatic stress disorder testimony should have been admitted to prove self-de-
fense); People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1992) (allowing forensic psychiatrist to
testify regarding a self-defense claim that ingestion of POP made the victim angry,
aggressive, and violent), affd, 511 U.S. 1 (1994); State v. Purcell, 669 N.E.2d 60
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding psychiatric testimony admissible to prove self-defense);
Commonwealth v. Kacsmar, 617 A.2d 725 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding battered
person syndrome admissible to establish self-defense).
55. See, e.g., State v. Maelega, 907 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1995) (using battered spouse
expert evidence to support extreme mental or emotional disturbance defense in an
effort to reduce murder charge to manslaughter).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Kan. 1995) (using
battered spouse syndrome to prove duress and compulsion); State v. Duncan, 830
P.2d 554 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (holding the exclusion of psychiatric testimony on
duress to be reversible error), affd, 805 P.2d 621 (N.M. 1991); State v. Riker, 869
P.2d 43, 47 (Wash. 1994) (examining use of BWS testimony to support a duress
defense).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Bastanipour, 41 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 1994) (excluding
expert testimony on coercion in drug possession case); United States v. Newman, 849
F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding admissible testimony regarding mental disease or
subnormal intelligence to show defendant was peculiarly susceptible to inducement
by government).
58. See, e.g., Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1993) (involving use of
psychiatric testimony in support of insanity defense); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d
93, 98 & n.2, 99 & n.3 (Minn. 1992) (examining use of psychiatric testimony on the
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In each of these newer areas, the testimony takes advantage
of, or tries to get the courts to adopt, relatively recent substan-
tive reforms in the law that subjectify inquiries into the
defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. For instance,
in some jurisdictions for some types of crimes, self-defense no
longer depends upon whether the force used by the defendant
was reasonably necessary, but on whether the defendant honest-
ly believed the force was necessary. 9 Similarly, in some juris-
dictions, a manslaughter instruction must be given not only
when a reasonable person would have been provoked, but also
when, to use the Model Penal Code's much-copied formula-
tion, o the provoked reaction was reasonable in light of the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he or she believed
them to be.6 Subjectifying blameworthiness in this way opens
the door wide to psychological speculations.
Nor has psychiatric testimony in criminal cases been limited
solely to assessments of mental state. Courts also have allowed
such testimony in support of a claim that the defendant does not
meet the act requirement of an offense. Usually, the testimony is
framed in terms of the defendant's character; someone with the
defendant's personality, the expert opinion suggests, could not
have (or could have) committed the offense in question. 2 The
first reported appellate opinion sanctioning such testimony was
issue of mens rea in several states).
59. The Model Penal Code endorses such an approach, at least when the belief
that defensive force is necessary is neither reckless nor negligent. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.09(2) (1985). In such cases, "self-defense" is probably better seen as an ex-
cuse than as a justification. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-08 (1997) ("A
person's conduct is excused if he believes that the facts are such that his conduct is
necessary and appropriate for any of the purposes which would establish a justifica-
tion or excuse under this chapter, even though his belief is mistaken.").
60. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985).
61. See People v. Shelton, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 434
N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001 (Or. 1984).
62. See United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1981) (sup-
porting trial court's exclusion of expert testimony that defendant's personality was
inconsistent with outrageous and senseless murders of his family); State v.
Treadaway, 568 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Ariz. 1977) (allowing testimony that defendant was
incapable of "inflicting grievous harm to anyone"); Kanaras v. State, 460 A.2d 61,
72-73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (allowing testimony that defendant is passive and
thus unable to commit violent crime).
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handed down during the 1950s,' but the phenomenon appears
to have been much more prevalent in the last twenty years.'
Still another way in which innovative lawyers have used psy-
chiatric testimony in recent years is as a method of addressing
the credibility of a witness. In a sense, this issue arises any time
a mental health professional testifies in support of or against a
psychiatric defense. An opinion that the defendant is insane sug-
gests that the defendant's claim of insanity is true, and a con-
trary opinion suggests the opposite. The type of credibility testi-
mony of concern here, however, is that testimony which is ex-
plicitly framed in terms of whether a witness other than the de-
fendant is telling the truth about some event. Perhaps the most
famous example was the psychiatric testimony presented in the
Alger Hiss trial, which asserted that Whittaker Chambers,
Hiss's prime accuser, was a psychopathic liar.65 That trial, like
the first character evidence cases, took place during the 1950s,
but it seems to have been well ahead of its time. Most appellate
cases dealing with expert testimony about the truthfulness of a
witness have come in the past two decades, many of them in
cases involving child abuse and rape.66
A related novel use of behavioral scientists is helping the trier
of fact determine whether a witness is accurate, as opposed to
truthful. The most obvious example of this practice is expert
testimony about the foibles of witnessing and remembering an
event. The eyewitness expert points to phenomena that can af-
fect one's registration of an event (e.g., weapons focus), memory
of an event (e.g., time), or recall of an event (e.g., suggestions by
the police).68 The jury then may consider this nomothetic infor-
63. See People v. Jones, 266 P.2d 38 (Cal. 1954).
64. See cases cited supra note 62.
65. See United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see also JUDSON
FAUKNOR, 1950 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW EVIDENCE 804-08 (1950), reprint-
ed in JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 484-86
(8th ed. 1995) (describing the use of psychiatric testimony in Hiss).
66. See, e.g., State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993) (involving child witness's
credibility); State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982) (involving rape victim's credi-
bility); State v. Wilson, 456 N.E.2d 1287 (Ohio 1982) (involving rape victim's credibil-
ity); see also Munoz v. State, 763 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (involving
credibility testimony in a murder trial).
67. A "truthful" witness is one who merely believes his or her story is accurate.
68. See generally ELIZABETH F. LoFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
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mation in deciding whether a particular eyewitness identifica-
tion is correct. A variant is testimony about the theoretical basis
for repressed memory, designed to support the validity of a sud-
den remembrance of an event that occurred years ago.69 Here,
however, the expert not only tends to provide information about
the theory of repressed memory but also vouches for the accura-
cy of the particular memory in question.
II. THE LAW'S APPROACH TO PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY
The admissibility of psychiatric evidence of the type described
in Part I hinges on the law governing expert testimony. That
law has gone through several transformations. In the end, how-
ever, the particular evidentiary formulation applied appears to
have little effect on the admission of psychiatric evidence. Re-
gardless of the test, traditional testimony is admitted readily,
while nontraditional testimony is subjected to a multi-factor
analysis that often bears little or no relationship to the language
of the relevant test.
A. Changes in Evidentiary Law
Before 1975, the usual threshold requirement for opinion tes-
timony was that it be based on specialized information "beyond
the ken of [the] jury."7 In theory, then, opinions about some-
36-39, 51-52, 90-94 (1979) (examining the effects of weapons focus, memory of events
over time, and police suggestion).
69. See Cole v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 681 N.E.2d 1157,
1159-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a party asserting repressed memory must
also provide expert testimony to support "the scientific validity of the phenomenon");
Barrett v. Hyldburg, 487 S.E.2d 803, 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding "testimony
regarding recovered memories ... may not be received at trial absent accompanying
expert testimony on the phenomenon of memory repression").
70. See Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 290 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that,
despite the inability to test repressed memories empirically, the theory of repressed
memory has been generally accepted and applies in this case); Isely v. Capuchin
Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (allowing expert to testify in a
civil case "as to whether Mr. Isely's behavior is consistent with someone who is suf-
fering repressed memory").
71. State v. Vaccaro, 298 A.2d 788, 792 (R.I. 1973) (holding that opinion of
spectographics expert must be "beyond the ken of [the] jury" to be permitted); see
also Dawson v. State, 439 P.2d 472, 473 (Nev. 1968) (holding, in a diminished ca-
pacity case, that "[an expert witness may state conclusions on matters within his
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thing the typical layperson could grasp were not admissible.72
Testimony that did meet this threshold might also be subject to
two further limitations. It could not rely on information, such as
hearsay, which was not independently admissible,73 and it
could not address the ultimate legal issue in the case.74
Coexisting with these rules, at the federal level and in many
states, was the Frye test. This test came from a 1923 case, Frye
v. United States,75 which held that the results of polygraph
testing were not admissible because the basis of the test was not
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs." 6 In many jurisdic-
tions, this "general acceptance" test became the primary means
of evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence, especially
novel scientific evidence in criminal cases.77 Indeed, many
courts evaluating such evidence relied entirely on Frye, without
any explicit inquiry into whether evidence was "beyond the ken
of the jury." 78
expert knowledge provided the conclusion is one laymen would not be capable of
drawing for themselves"); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §
702[02], at 702-10 (1996) (noting that prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules,
the test for expert. testimony typically was whether the testimony was "within the
common knowledge of the average layman").
72. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 71, at 702-10 (noting "no need for ex-
pert testimony unless the issue to which the testimony would be directed is 'not
within the common knowledge of the average layman'").
73. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the "majority view"
was "that a question is improper if it calls for the witness' opinion on the basis of
reports that are not in evidence or are inadmissible in evidence under the hearsay
rule." 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15 at 62 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992).
74. See id. § 12 at 47-48 ("[Uqntil about 35 years ago, a very substantial number
of courts . . . had announced the general doctrine that witnesses would not be per-
mitted to give their opinions or conclusions upon an ultimate fact in issue.").
75. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
76. Id. at 1014.
77. As certain commentators have noted:
In civil cases, Frye would not be cited as a guiding principle until 1984,
and was mentioned in less than half a dozen civil cases. In criminal cas-
es, by contrast, Frye became the polestar to guide the admission of test
results from dozens of widely varied techniques that poured out of the
growing number of crime laboratories in the 1970s.
ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 8
(4th ed. 1995).
78. See Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dis-
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In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect. On
their face, the new federal rules governing expert testimo-
ny-widely copied by the states-relaxed previous restrictions.
Under Rule 702, opinions based on "scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge" need only "assist the trier of fact to un-
derstand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."79 While
the difference between evidence that "assists" and evidence that
is '"beyond the ken" may be subtle, the former language suggests
a greater willingness to classify an opinion as expert, and courts
have so held.8" In more obvious contrast with previous practice
in many jurisdictions, Rule 703 permits opinion to be based on
otherwise inadmissible information if it is "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field."8' Finally, again
in contrast to the law in at least some jurisdictions at the time it
went into effect, Rule 704 permitted qualified opinion testimony
to "embrace[] an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact."8
2
Although Rule 703's "reasonable reliance" language resonated
with Frye, the commentary to that rule and the other federal
rules governing expert testimony made no reference to that
case.8" Nonetheless, many courts continued to apply Frye to sci-
entific evidence, with or without reference to the federal rules or
missed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969); Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 191 N.E.2d 479, 480-
81 (Mass. 1963); see also John William Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 14 (The Frye standard . . . tends to ob-
scure . . . proper considerations by asserting an undefinable general acceptance as
the principle if not sole determinative factor.").
79. FED. R. EVID. 702.
80. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226-32 (3d Cir. 1985) (recog-
nizing, in context of eyewitness testimony, that Rule 702 calls for a more liberalized
admissibility standard than the "beyond the ken" inquiry); State v. Bednarz, 507
N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding expert testimony on BWS admissi-
ble even though the dynamics of domestic abuse are not unknown to the layperson);
see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 73, § 13 at 54 ("Rule 702 should
permit expert opinion even if the matter is within the competence of the jurors if
specialized knowledge will be helpful ... .
81. FED. R. EVID. 703.
82. FED. R. EVID. 704. But see infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
83. See 2 STEPHEN SALTZBURG & KENNETH REDDEN, FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 15 (5th ed. 1990) ("It is not clear whether Rules 702 and 703 are intended
to codify something like the Frye test or whether they establish a less demanding
standard for scientific evidence . . ").
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the analogous state rules.' Other courts developed their own
separate screening tests for scientific testimony. For instance,
one test looked at whether there was "substantial," as opposed
to general, acceptance of the subject matter,s and another fo-
cused on whether the opinion was "the product of an explicable
and reliable" system of analysis. 6
Still other courts, with the support of most commentators,87
rejected separate screening tests for expert testimony.8 In-
stead, these jurisdictions adhered to the Federal Rules' "helpful-
ness" analysis, supplemented by the balancing test applicable to
any proffered evidence; under this regime, any helpful special-
ized knowledge from a qualified expert is admissible unless its
potential for confusing the jury, prejudicing one of the parties, or
wasting time substantially outweighs its probative value. 9 This
approach might be called the 401/403 balancing test, in refer-
ence to the federal rules that deal with the definition of rele-
vance 90 and the delineation of countervailing factors.9
84. See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 77, at 12 (discussing the post-1975 division
of jurisdictions into at least three groups, one that rejected Frye in favor of the fed-
eral rules, one that held that Frye survived the rules and is complementary to Rule
702, and the third that adopted neither approach). See, e.g., United States v. Two
Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[We feel Rule 702 and Frye both require
the same general approach to the admissibility of new scientific evidence."); United
States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that Rule 702
is not met unless the expert testimony "conforms to a generally accepted explanatory
theory").
85. United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 558 (4th Cir. 1985).
86. State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Haw. 1982).
87. The authors of McCormick on Evidence find the "relevancy" approach "the
most appealing." 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 73, § 203, at 874. They
cite a long list of commentators who agree, including 1 DAVID W. LOUisELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105 (1977); Margaret A. Berger, A
Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 89, 89-91 (1987); and
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique
from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554 (1983).
88. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 73, § 203, at 872 ("[Sleveral juris-
dictions expressly have rejected Frye, leaving the task of regulating the admission of
scientific evidence to the normal doctrines of relevancy and helpfulness of expert
testimony.").
89. See id.
90. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
91. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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In short, even at the federal level, the scope and effect of Rule
702 and its companion rules were unclear for many years. Then
came the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals.92 In that case, the Court rejected what it
called the "austere" Frye standard as the sole test of admissibili-
ty in favor of the multi-factor "liberal" regime of the federal
rules.93 Under this approach, the Court explained, courts are to
judge the admissibility of scientific evidence by its "helpfulness,"
which in turn depends on "whether the reasoning or methodol-
ogy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and...
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied
to facts in issue."94 Validity, said the Court, can be determined
by the "falsifiability" or "testability" of the theory and methodol-
ogy underlying it; the error rate associated with the theory or
procedure; the extent to which it has been subject to peer review
and publication; and the extent to which it has been generally
accepted by the relevant field. 5 Although the latter factor obvi-
ously echoes Frye, the difference under Daubert is that general
acceptance is now neither necessary nor sufficient for admis-
sibility. Some states have followed the federal lead and adopted
Daubert;6 others have adhered to Frye or its equivalent.97
B. The Impact of Evidentiary Law on Psychiatric Testimony
How has all of this evidentiary ferment affected psychiatric
testimony? Not at all, if one focuses exclusively on traditional
psychiatric evidence. Mental health professionals who testify in
insanity cases relying on a typical Axis I or Axis II diagnosis98
92. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
93. See id. at 588-89.
94. Id. at 592-93.
95. See id. at 593-94.
96. See Jones v. State, 862 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Ark. 1993) (noting the adoption of a
Daubert-like standard in Arkansas prior to the Daubert decision); State v. Porter,
698 A.2d 739, 746-52 (Conn. 1997); State v. Cephas, 637 A.2d 20 (Del. 1994); State
v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993); State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916 (N.H. 1997).
97. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1181-83 (Ariz. 1993); People v. Leahy, 882
P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1997); Tungate v.
Commonwealth, 901 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Ky. 1995); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304,
1313-15 (Wash. 1996).
98. The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, cur-
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have been able to say virtually anything they want in court,
post-Frye, post-Rule 702, and post-Daubert.5 Most forensic
mental health professionals have never had their testimony
challenged.0 0 The only significant limitation on such opinion
has been a prohibition on ultimate testimony concerning mental
state, introduced in the federal system in the wake of the
Hinckley trial in 1984,°0 and even that limitation has had
very little practical effect. 102
rently in its fourth edition, conceptualizes assessment of human functioning along
five axes. Axis I (clinical disorders, such as the psychoses) and Axis II (personality
disorders and mental retardation) comprise all the "mental disorders" catalogued in
the DSM. The other axes deal with "general medical conditions" (Axis III),
"psychosocial and environmental problems" (Axis IV), and "global assessment of func-
tioning" (Axis V). See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 25 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
99. For instance, one review of post-Daubert case law, which one would assume to
be the most likely group of cases to view traditional testimony with skepticism, ap-
parently found that of the 30 or so opinions that applied Daubert to social science
evidence, an overwhelming number involved "syndrome" testimony. See James T.
Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evi-
dence, 79 JUDICATURE 10, 15-16 (1995).
100. I base this statement on conversations with participants in training programs
that I have taught, see supra note 30, as well as the results of an informal survey
sent out in December, 1996 on Psy-Law, a listserve with over 900 members, most of
whom are practicing forensic mental health professionals. See listserv<psylaw-L@
UTEPUM.EP.UTEXAS.EDU>. All respondents (N=9) agreed with the statement in
the text. One veteran (Charles Ewing) stated that "in 99 percent of what we do we
don't have to worry about Frye, Daubert or 702," and another (Joe Dixon) stated "I
have been involved with hundreds of criminal cases over the past ten years and tes-
tified in federal and state court dozens and dozens of times, and yes, you are correct,
I have rarely had my testimony challenged on the grounds you mention." The rest of
the sample stated that they had never been challenged on lack-of-expertise grounds.
101. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b). The rule states:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.
Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
Id.
102. See United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (permit-
ting expert testimony that "someone who had drunk as much as [the defendant]
would have a diminished capacity to think and plan"); United States v. Kristiansen,
901 F.2d 1463, 1466 (8th Cir. 1990) (permitting defense counsel to ask whether the
mental disease of the type the defendant allegedly had "would affect a person's abili-
ty to appreciate their actions"); United States v. Davis, 835 F.2d 274, 276 (11th Cir.
1988) (approving the trial court's inquiry of appellant's expert regarding the capabili-
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In "nontraditional" contexts, however, the courts have been
more willing to scrutinize the admissibility of psychiatric testi-
mony. Thus, opinions about pathological gambling, the effect of
an extra Y chromosome, BWS, RTS, CSAAS, and eyewitness ac-
curacy have all been subjected to one of the screening tests men-
tioned above." 3 Application of such a test often means the tes-
timony is excluded, although, as detailed below, not always or
for all purposes.
The first question one might ask in light of these facts is why
traditional testimony has been exempted from any type of
screening analysis. Although there are several possible answers
to this question, the two upon which courts seem to rely are
neatly summarized by the California Supreme Court in describ-
ing when it applies its version of the Frye test:
First, Kelly-Frye only applies to that limited class of expert
testimony which is based, in whole or in part, on a technique,
process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so,
the law.... The second theme in cases applying Kelly-Frye is
that the unproven technique or procedure appears in both
name and description to provide some definitive truth which
the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the
jury.10
Applied in our context, this reasoning suggests that traditional
psychiatric testimony is not subject to judicial scrutiny because
ty of an individual diagnosed with multiple personalities to understand what he or
she was doing).
103. See United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (pathological
gambling); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-83 (1st Cir. 1979) (eyewitness
identification testimony); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983)
(BWS); State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Haw. 1982) (child sexual abuse situa-
tion); State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 14 (Wash. 1987) (RTS); State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d
754, 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (XYY syndrome).
104. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 710 (Cal. 1989); see also State v. Varela, 873
P.2d 657, 663-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that psychiatric testimony that "is
not 'new, novel or experimental scientific evidence' . . does not require the addi-
tional screening provided by Frye"). In contrast to courts applying Frye, courts apply-
ing Daubert usually reject the novelty threshold. See, e.g., United States v. Bighead,
128 F.3d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding Daubert not limited to scientific evi-
dence that is novel). To date, however, none have applied Daubert to what this
Article defines as "traditional" testimony. For instance, the testimony to which
Daubert was applied in Bighead involved CSAAS. See id. at 1330.
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(1) it is traditional; and, more persuasively, (2) juries are not
likely to consider it objective or infallible, but rather will natu-
rally treat it with skepticism.
Assuming a particular type of psychiatric evidence is thought
to be "novel" enough to require screening, a second question
arises: How do courts apply the relevant screening test? This
question is more difficult to answer because, as Professor
McCord has demonstrated, application of the general acceptance
test and similar screening tests in the psychiatric context seem
to be placeholders for other concerns." 5 Interestingly enough,
to the extent they are explicitly mentioned or discernable from
the cases, these concerns appear to parallel the trends in nontra-
ditional psychiatric testimony that were previously described in
Part I of this Article.' 6 As a general matter, the more nomo-
thetic, scientific-looking, nonmedically oriented and doctrinally
suspicious testimony is, the more likely courts will exclude it.
A few examples illustrate this point. First, consider testimony
about the accuracy of eyewitness identification. As social science
testimony goes, this type of opinion evidence is highly reli-
able,107 yet courts often exclude it.'0 8 Many courts point to
the fact that such testimony is usually not based on the facts of
105. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Ap-
proach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cas-
es, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 87-88 (1987) (noting that the "problem with these standards"
is that they imply they are outcome determinative when in fact "there is no one
factor that is dispositive with respect to the admissibility of non-traditional psycho-
logical evidence"). McCord makes the same finding with respect to judicial applica-
tion of Rule 702's assistance test:
[C]ourts rarely examine in detail the circumstances of the particular case
to determine if the particular testimony would assist the jury. Courts are
instead content to simply pigeonhole the testimony as to type (e.g., rape
trauma syndrome, battered wife syndrome, etc.) and then opine in gener-
al whether such testimony would be helpful to the jury.
Id. at 92.
106. See supra notes 39-70 and accompanying text.
107. See Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Re-
liability Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and the Science, 13 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 229, 256 (1995) (arguing that such testimony meets the reliability require-
ments of Daubert).
108. See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New
Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1032 (1995) (concluding
that most courts resist admitting such testimony).
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the case or contact with the eyewitness involved, but rather on
pre-published research findings 09-- in other words, it is social
framework evidence par excellence. Other courts worry about
the jury being able to analyze expert testimony concerning eye-
witnesses."' In other words, due to the nomothetic and scien-
tific appearance of such evidence, judges believe it is both less
relevant (as a result of its general nature) and more likely to
confuse or overawe the jury."'
Expert opinions describing the effects of poverty, television,
and inner city living on criminal defendants have not fared well
either."' To some extent, exclusion of this type of evidence
may be due to the factors just discussed. But the opinions in
these cases suggest a second explanation for judicial hostility:
These types of claims depart from the medical model to such a
great extent that they conjure up fears of legal anarchy. After
109. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla. 1990) (upholding trial court
discretion to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification); State v.
Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710, 713-14 (R.I. 1994) (excluding expert testimony based on gen-
eral research findings).
110. See United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) (excluding expert
testimony that "intrude[d into the jury's domain"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1015
(1997). See generally Handberg, supra note 108, at 1032-41 (cataloguing the bases for
rejection of expert testimony on eyewitness accuracy).
111. That is not to say that all courts react this way to eyewitness testimony or
other types of social framework evidence. See Handberg, supra note 108, at 1041; see
also Terrio v. McDonough, 450 N.E.2d 190, 198 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (holding ex-
pert testimony on RTS involving the manner in which victims react to rape admissi-
ble because it was "cast in tentative generalities, without regard to the incident or
persons involved" in the case, and did not state that the plaintiff had, in fact, been
raped). Ultimately, trying to find consistent patterns in the case law is a futile en-
terprise. The effort here is merely to explain the most prominent reasons behind the
exclusion of psychiatric testimony.
112. In the first case raising the rotten social background defense, the trial judge
specifically instructed the jury to pay no attention to that line of argument, an in-
struction upheld by the appellate court. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923,
959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting and sanctioning instruction to jury which said:
"We are not concerned with a question of whether or not a man had a rotten social
background."). In the one reported television intoxication case, the court ruled the
research testimony supporting the defense inadmissible. See Zamora v. State, 361 So.
2d 776, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In the one reported case in which a defen-
dant explicitly raised the urban survival syndrome defense, the expert evidence was
permitted at the first trial but excluded at the second. See Lori Montgomery, Teen
Guilty of Murder: Urban Theory Not Allowed, DETROr FREE PRESS, Nov. 12, 1994,
at 6A.
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all, the judges in these types of cases seem to be saying, almost
everyone who commits a crime is subject to some type of trau-
matizing condition; we cannot excuse them all.
Consider these comments from Judge McGowan, who wrote a
portion of the majority opinion in United States v. Alexander,"'
the leading "rotten social background" case:
The tragic and senseless events giving rise to these appeals
are a recurring byproduct of a society which, unable as yet to
eliminate explosive racial tensions, appears equally paralyzed
to deny easy access to guns. Cultural infantilism of this kind
inevitably exacts a high price, which in this instance was
paid by the two young officers who were killed. The ultimate
responsibility for their deaths reaches far beyond these [two
African-Americans].
As courts, however, we administer a system of justice which
is limited in its reach. We deal only with those formally ac-
cused under laws which define criminal accountability nar-
rowly.1
14
Judge McGowan added that the court was upholding the trial
court's instructions because they "remind the jury that the issue
before them for decision is not one of the shortcomings of society
generally, but rather that of appellant Murdock's criminal re-
sponsibility for the illegal acts of which he had earlier been
found guilty."
15
Of even greater interest, in light of his well-known willingness
to broaden the scope of the insanity defense,"6 are the similar
comments of Judge Bazelon. In his dissenting opinion in Alexan-
der, Judge Bazelon began by giving several reasons why the law
113. 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
114. Id. at 965 (dictum) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 968 (emphasis added).
116. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
J., concurring) (arguing against the "mental disease or defect" predicate to the insan-
ity defense, as well as the requirement that specific behavioral impairments be
shown, and advocating adoption of a test that would require a person to be found
insane "if at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or
behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be held re-
sponsible for his act").
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should recognize a combination bad upbringing/black rage de-
fense."' He also conceded, however, that
[iut does not necessarily follow ... that we should push the
responsibility defense to its logical limits and abandon all the
trappings of the medical or disease model. However illogical
and disingenuous, that model arguably serves important pur-
poses. Primarily, by offering a rationale for detention of per-
sons who are found not guilty by reason of "insanity," it offers
us shelter from a downpour of troublesome questions."'
The judges in Alexander are not alone in such sentiments. In the
Zamora case involving the television intoxication defense, the
appellate court made analogous observations:
In the concluding pages of defense counsel's lengthy brief the
following language appears: "In the case at bar, television
was on trial . . . ." Such was simply not the case ....
[Tielevision was not on trial; Ronny Zamora was on trial ....
Stated simply, this was a murder trial, and it is to the trial
judge's credit that he confined the testimony and evidence to
the relevant issues. 19
In other words, these judges conclude, the criminal law's inquiry
into accountability should focus on endogenous, not exogenous,
causes.
Finally, in some cases, exclusion of novel psychiatric testimo-
ny seems to be based not on its nomothetic or nonmedical nature
but on the fact that it pushes the doctrinal envelope. Here, how-
ever, judges are not always as explicit about their reasoning;
their skepticism about substance may be masked by evidentiary
rulings. Both these points are illustrated by United States v.
Lewellyn, 20 which rejected pathological gambling as a basis for
an insanity defense on Frye grounds. 2 ' The trial court testimo-
ny about pathological gambling was both individualized and
medical-model based.'22 Moreover, the pathological gambling
117. See Alexander, 471 F.2d at 957-61 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 961 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
119. Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
120. 723 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1983).
121. See id. at 619-20.
122. See id. at 618-20 (describing the testimony of Drs. Taber and Custer).
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diagnosis had been ensconced in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual for four years, and was thus presumptively "accept-
ed." '123 Still, the court excluded the testimony." As Professor
Bonnie has argued, the real motivation for this type of ruling is
probably the concern that permitting acquittal in such cases
would open the floodgates to traditionally disfavored volitional
impairment claims.'
Substantive misgivings have also affected evidentiary analysis
of clinical testimony concerning mens rea. Although diminished
capacity evidence is clearly material and often not much differ-
ent from insanity testimony in content, it is limited in many
irrational ways.'26 Similarly, courts have rejected psychiatric
testimony in self-defense cases on what appear to be substantive
grounds, even though they claim to be relying on evidentiary
rules.'27 The same reaction often occurs when judges are con-
fronted by psychiatrically-based claims about whether a criminal
act occurred and whether a witness is truthful or accurate. Even
if such claims have probative value, judges resist them in large
part because they are more likely than traditional testimony to
encroach on well-accepted lay functions, or "usurp the jury," as
courts often put it.2'
123. See id. at 619 (noting that the diagnosis was in the third edition of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), published in 1980, and
that both experts testified that this meant it was a "generally accepted" diagnosis).
The court justified its contrary holding on the general acceptance issue by noting
that pathological gambling was not recognized in the second edition of the DSM,
published in 1968, and that only 20 to 25 doctors were experienced with the diag-
nosis. See id. at 619-20.
124. See id. at 620.
125. See Richard Bonnie, Compulsive Gambling and the Insanity Defense, 9 NEWSL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCmIATRY & L. 6, 7 (1984).
126. See generally REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 28 (detailing the "mental dis-
ease or defect," "capacity," and "crime" limitations on diminished capacity testimony).
127. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984) (holding that testimony
about battered children was inadmissible under Frye, but also stating that "the no-
tion that a victim of abuse is entitled to kill the abuser . . .is antithetical to the
mores of modern civilized society").
128. See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting an
expert's testimony about whether a victim was telling the truth about being abused
on the grounds that accepting such testimony may cause juries to "surrender their
own common sense in weighing testimony"); State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 332
(Iowa 1992) ("Our cases also hold . . .that expert psychological evidence may not be
[Vol. 40:1
1998] PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 27
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the courts' approach
to psychiatric evidence is how minimal a role reliability plays in
determining admissibility. Recall first that the two reasons giv-
en by the California Supreme Court for exempting traditional
testimony from special judicial scrutiny-precedent and the ac-
cessibility of the evidence'!-have nothing to do with reliabili-
ty. Even more surprisingly, reliability does not seem to play
much of a role in determining the admissibility of nontraditional
psychiatric testimony, even when it is subjected to one of the
screening tests. Outside the psychiatric context, Frye's general
acceptance test has often been used as a proxy for a reliability
assessment,30 and Daubert, of course, specifically requires an
evaluation of scientific validity. 3 ' According to one mammoth
study,'32 however, the courts ignore these maxims when psy-
chiatric testimony is at issue. Based on a comprehensive analy-
sis of the cases, the authors of the study concluded that "[c]ourts
are not generally engaging in scientific reviews of the proferred
syndrome[; miost typically, the focus is on general acceptance
and the qualifications of the expert, and even then the judicial
review tends to be cursory.""3
used to merely bolster a witnesses's credibility . . .because veracity is not a 'fact in
issue' subject to expert opinion [and] . . .is uniquely within a lay jury's common un-
derstanding."); Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986) (rejecting
credibility testimony about a child witness because it "would be an invitation for
the trier of fact to abdicate its responsibility to ascertain the facts relying upon
the questionable premise that the expert is in a better position to make such a
judgment").
129. See People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 710 (Cal. 1989).
130. See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FoRDHAM L. REV.
595, 628 (1988) ("The cases since Frye reveal extreme incoherence and inconsistency
in the application of the general acceptance test. In most ... the Frye test merely
masks legal decisions about reliability.").
131. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993).
132. See James T. Richardson et al., A Case Law Survey of Social and Behavioral
Science Evidence After Daubert (unpublished manuscript, presented at 1998 Ameri-
can Psychology-Law Association Annual Meeting, on file with author).
133. Id.; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert in the States, 34
CRIM. L. BuLL. 154, 155-60 (1998) (surveying post-Daubert approaches to expert
testimony and contrasting the Daubert "reliability" approach with the Frye approach
and the relevancy approach); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1223-25 (1980) (noting that the Frye test both excludes reliable evidence and admits
unreliable evidence).
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As a concrete illustration of the judicial tendency to ignore
reliability and focus instead on the types of factors discussed
above, consider the way the courts have handled claims based on
some version of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)-i.e.,
claims of Vietnam veterans, child sex abuse victims, rape vic-
tims, and battered women. If reliability were the test, one might
conjecture that, because the same basic diagnosis is at issue,"
the analysis of admissibility would be the same with respect to
each. It is not, however. Because Vietnam veterans almost al-
ways use PTSD in support of an insanity defense,' they have
had no problem introducing such testimony."6 In contrast, al-
leged rape victims have had some trouble doing so and alleged
child sex abuse victims have met much more judicial resis-
tance,3 ' largely because courts perceive this evidence as an ef-
fort to prove a criminal act occurred, or at least to bolster the
victim's credibility.138
BWS has the most interesting story in this regard. Women
who introduced the syndrome in self-defense cases were rebuffed
at first,"9 but today not only do many jurisdictions judicially
permit testimony about BWS, 4 ° a number actually guarantee
134. See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 77, at 1147-48 (categorizing these and
other types of testimony under the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder rubric).
135. See C. Peter Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder and Criminal Behavior, 25 B.C. L. REV. 305, 328 (1984) (noting that all
known examples of PTSD testimony in Vietnam veteran cases through 1983 involve
"the affirmative defense of insanity").
136. See McCord, supra note 105, at 66 ("The admissibility of this type of testimo-
ny has met with no problems on the appellate level.").
137. According to one source, "the courts have not been as generous" toward admis-
sibility of evidence of CSAAS as they have been toward admissibility of RTS evi-
dence. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 77, at 1154.
138. See United States v. Whitted, 994 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
expert testimony on CSAAS impermissibly invaded the province of the jury); State v.
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) (holding that to allow RTS to prove
"whether [a rape] has occurred ... would . . . invade the jury's province of
factfinding"); State v. Hutchens, 429 S.E.2d 755, 758-59 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (hold-
ing inadmissible CSAAS testimony to the effect that the emotional state of the vic-
tim was consistent with the type of behavior exhibited by child sex abuse victims);
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 547 A.2d 355, 357 (Pa. 1988) (noting that expert testi-
mony regarding RTS "was introduced for the sole purpose of shoring up the credibil-
ity of the victim on the crucial issue of identification"); see also supra note 128 (list-
ing cases rejecting expert testimony on witness veracity).
139. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993); State v. Anaya, 438
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its legitimacy through legislation.' The syndrome met initial
resistance because it sometimes undermined the necessity re-
quirement of traditional self-defense law-acquitting a woman
for killing her batterer even when he was not attacking her at
the time struck courts as antithetical to the "imminent threat"
threshold of justification doctrine.' More recently, however,
as Professor Mosteller has pointed out, the ground swell of
support for battered women has led courts and legislatures,
implicitly or explicitly," to subjectify self-defense law in this
type of case. In other words, substantive law has been changed
in response to political pressures, and thus the syndrome no
longer pushes the doctrinal envelope.
III. TOWARD A MORE NUANCED APPROACH TO PSYCHIATRIC
TESTIMONY
The courts' often chaotic approach to the admissibility of psy-
chiatric evidence in criminal trials could benefit from a coherent
analytical framework. One such framework-embodied in Rules
401, 403 and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence-already ex-
ists. Under Rules 401 and 403, any evidence, expert or other-
wise, must be evaluated in terms of how its relevance to the
facts at issue weighs against countervailing factors. 5 When
A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); State v. Hill, 339
S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1986); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).
141. According to Professor Mosteller, at least eleven states have a specific
statutory authorization mandating admissibility of BWS evidence. See Robert P.
Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE
L.J. 461, 484 n.77 (1996).
142. See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 77, at 1135 (noting that in early battered
spouse cases, "[w]omen were foreclosed altogether from using a self defense claim
because the killing was not committed during an abusive attack").
143. See Mosteller, supra note 141, at 486-91 (discussing trend toward admission of
BWS evidence).
144. See id. at 488-89 ("Despite the fact that change is coming through an eviden-
tiary rule rather than a modification of self-defense law, my point remains: courts
and legislatures are altering the substantive law by admitting a new class of evi-
dence that will produce predictably different outcomes.").
145. See FED. R. EViD. 401, 403.
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the evidence is offered as expert evidence, it must further "as-
sist" the factfinder, as Rule 702 requires. "'
As Part II made clear, although courts routinely refer to these
rules or their equivalent, they often fail to take one or more of
them seriously, or they add additional considerations that cloud
the analysis. 47 This part of the Article fleshes out a more
structured, four-step approach to evaluating the admissibility of
psychiatric evidence using the federal rules. The first part of
this approach involves gauging the relevance of the evidence, an
inquiry which itself has traditionally been broken down into two
steps: an assessment of materiality and an assessment of proba-
tive value. The next step involves assessing the helpfulness of
the evidence. The final step focuses on whether there are signifi-
cant countervailing reasons for excluding the testimony.
A. Relevance-Materiality
Assessing the materiality of evidence requires an understand-
ing of the governing substantive law. The previous section dis-
cussed the tendency of courts to exclude evidence that stretches
traditional doctrinal boundaries. Unfortunately, this tendency is
not always explicit; as already noted, one often gets the sense
that exclusion of evidence on lack of helpfulness or acceptance
grounds is a smokescreen hiding a more pressing concern about
substantive impact. "8 At the other extreme, as James Wilson
has documented, some courts at both the trial and appellate lev-
el seem willing to admit almost any kind of testimony proffered
by a mental health professional, without regard to its logical
connection to the law of the jurisdiction. 49 Neither approach is
appropriate. Courts need to address the materiality issue head
146. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 98-144.
148. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
149. See JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXcUSE THREATEN
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 89 (1997). Wilson argues that courts have ignored the distinc-
tion between judging a defendant, which involves considering "mental state only to
the extent necessary to establish the existence of one or another of a small list of
excusing or justifying defenses," and explaining the defendant's actions, which
"searches for a full account of the factors--the motives, circumstances, and be-
liefs-that caused them." Id. at 90.
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on. If they did so, they might not have to worry about reliability
and helpfulness issues.
Take, for instance, testimony that people with an extra Y
chromosome are statistically more likely to commit crime. This
testimony is clearly not material to any defense based on cogni-
tive impairment (i.e., lack of mens rea, self-defense, or the cogni-
tive prong of the insanity defense). People with more "maleness"
still intend to commit the crimes they commit and know that it
is wrong do so. 5' Even in a jurisdiction with a volitional prong
to the insanity defense, XYY testimony ought to be excluded on
materiality grounds. That people with two Y chromosomes are
more likely to commit crime than people with only one does not
mean the former are compelled to do so; at most it means they
have a stronger or more frequent urge to commit crime than
others. As Professor Michael Moore has argued persuasively,
because all behavior is caused by something (biology, environ-
ment, character, or situation), proof of causation alone cannot be
proof of compulsion, nor can it support an excuse. 5' The fact
that people with tempers, people who grew up in poverty-strick-
en conditions, or people with low intelligence are more likely to
commit crime does not excuse them from it. As Moore contends,
unless the causative agent renders one unable to control one's
actions rationally, compulsion is not present.'52
The same analysis can be directed at any psychiatric evidence
that consists merely of a correlation between criminal activity
and a certain trait (e.g., antisocial personality disorder, a partic-
ular brain structure, excess testosterone, premenstrual anxiety).
150. Cf People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (Ct. App. 1970) (holding XYY
testimony inadmissible because, inter alia, the experts could not state that an extra
Y chromosome prevented defendant from knowing the nature and quality of his act
or that it was wrong); see also Millard v. State, 261 A.2d 227, 231 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1970) (noting that the presence of the XYY "genetic abnormality" would not, of
itself, indicate a lack of "substantial capacity" to appreciate the criminality of partic-
ular conduct); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (noting
inadequacy of existing research in determining a causal connection between 'XYY
genetic phenomenon" and "a predisposition toward violent criminal conduct").
151. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L..REV. 1091, 1130
(1985).
152. See id. at 1129-30 ("The difference between compulsion and causation comes to
this: compulsion involves interference with practical reasoning .... Most causes of
human behavior do not operate as compulsions.").
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Nonetheless, not only courts, but many commentators seem to
believe that any evidence describing a link between criminal
behavior and an "abnormality" is material. 5' That approach
disregards (and therefore undermines) the substantive criminal
law.
Courts have often been more attuned to materiality analysis
in the self-defense context. For instance, as noted earlier, a
number of courts have held that psychiatric evidence about
learned helplessness in battered women is material only in cases
where the woman was imminently threatened by death or seri-
ous bodily harm at the hands of her victim." It was also noted
that many jurisdictions have abandoned this relatively "objec-
tive" approach and permitted acquittal on self-defense grounds
even when the perceived threats are more long term.' Few
courts, however, have fine tuned the materiality analysis any
further. One intermediate option, at least in homicide cases,
would be to hold the woman liable unless the objective facts in-
dicate an imminent threat, but permit a reduction from murder
to manslaughter or negligent homicide if she made a mistake as
to imminence that was reckless or negligent, respectively.'
153. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background"." Should the Criminal
Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation? 3 L. & INEQUALITY 9,
12-23 (1985) (examining the debate over the validity of rotten social background as a
defense); Falk, supra note 5, at 809 ("[If the criminal law restricts itself to the con-
sideration of only short-term causal explanations for criminal behavior, it will miss
the rich contribution these theories of defense can make by elucidating more diffuse
and long-term pathogenic factors in criminal behavior."); David Skeen, The Genetical-
ly Defective Offender, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 217 (1983) (arguing inter alia that
testimony about chromosomal abnormality ought to be admissible); Cf MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 120-28 (1994) (suggesting
that the law's adherence to intentionality and free will paradigms may be outmoded
given science's "remarkable contrary evidence").
154. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. The traditional approach to self-
defense is summarized by Professors LaFave and Scott as follows:
One who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a rea-
sonable amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably be-
lieves that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from
his adversary and that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this
danger.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7, at 454 (2d ed. 1986)
(emphasis added).
155. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
156. This approach seems similar to that taken under section 3.09(2) of the Model
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Under this regime, a battered woman who killed in response to
an objectively nonimminent danger (e.g., a sleeping husband)
would be convicted of some form of homicide, rather than acquit-
ted outright.'57
This is not the place to debate the appropriate contours of
these difficult political and moral issues. The important point for
present purposes is that courts and legislatures need to think
hard about the scope of the insanity defense, self-defense, and
other defensive doctrines. They should not dodge these issues
through suspect rulings about psychiatric evidence.15s
B. Relevance-Probative Value
Daubert is right: The federal rules do, and should, require an
assessment of reliability. Evidence that is unreliable has no pro-
bative value.
The more difficult issue is how one measures reliability.
Daubert provides a starting point by recognizing the various
ways reliability can be gauged, including assessment of its basis
using the scientific method, proof of its error rate, peer review,
and, if all else fails, an assessment of whether its basis is gener-
Penal Code, which only provides a defense for a non-negligent belief-defined as a
belief that is reasonable for a person in the defendant's "situation--that force is
necessary. See supra note 59. The latter provision, however, could be construed to
allow a complete defense for a battered woman if "situation" is defined subjectively.
In terms of the "stereotypical" battered woman's situation, a mistaken belief that
serious harm was imminent and that the woman could only prevent it through kill-
ing might be considered nonreckless and even nonnegligent. See Martha R. Mahoney,
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 92-93 (1991) (comparing the battered woman to a hostage and stating "[w]e
believe the danger to a hostage is imminent both because the force used to hold
them there is apparent and because our cultural knowledge includes the memory of
the many hostages who have been harmed in the past").
157. A court might reach the same sort of result through application of the provo-
cation doctrine. See State v. Whitney-Biggs, 936 P.2d 1047 (Or. Ct. App.) (upholding
manslaughter conviction of defendant who shot her husband despite lack of immi-
nent threat), review denied, 943 P.2d 633 (Or. 1997).
158. Of course, materiality is not a fixed quantum. Evidence can be more or less
material. For instance, in a case involving an armed perpetrator, proof that eyewit-
nesses forget what they see relatively quickly is not as material as proof that people
confronted with weapons tend to focus on the weapon. The level of materiality is a
factor that must be considered in conjunction with the other components of admissi-
bility analysis.
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ally accepted.'59 The Court appeared to place general accep-
tance at the bottom of the measurement hierarchy, and rightly
so. The fact that professionals in the field routinely rely on par-
ticular theories or methodologies is useful information in deter-
mining admissibility, but it is no substitute for a
straightforward assessment of accuracy, if such an assessment is
possible.
Thus, contrary to Daubert's suggestion, the test developed in
that case under Rule 702 is not always more "liberal" than the
Frye test. Indeed, in the psychiatric context, it is the latter test
that is likely to produce more generous results. Testimony based
on traditional psychiatric nosology is, almost by definition, gen-
erally accepted. 6 ' Much of it, however, is not very reliable. For
example, testimony about personality disorders such as schizoid
personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder has
played a prominent (and unchallenged) role in many trials, yet
both laboratory and field trials show that the "error rate" for
these diagnoses is well above fifty percent."6' Only psychiatric
evidence that is based on research and that is new to the field is
likely to fail the general acceptance test and still have a chance
of success under Daubert.
159. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
160. After all, if a particular diagnosis is in DSM-IV, it has survived considerable
debate within the profession. See, e.g., United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1509
& n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (taking judicial notice that a condition listed in the DSM is a
recognized psychiatric condition). For an interesting description of the DSM develop-
ment process, see David Goleman, Who's Mentally Ill?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1978,
at 34.
161. Although laboratory tests of DSM diagnoses such as schizophrenia and mood
disorders indicate a high reliability rate, field tests have arrived at different results
even for these major diagnoses. See Paul Lieberman & Frances M. Baker, The Reli-
ability of Psychiatric Diagnosis in the Emergency Room, 36 HOsP. & COMM.
PSYCHIAT. 291, 292 (1985) (showing 41% agreement on schizophrenia, 50% agreement
on mood disorders, and 37% agreement on organic brain syndromes). For subcatego-
ries of the major diagnostic classifications (e.g., subtypes of schizophrenia, schizoid
personality disorder), the agreement in field trials is often much lower, between 10
and 40%. See id.; see also Graham Mellsop et al., The Reliability of Axis II of DSM-
III, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1360, 1361 (1982) (finding that reliability of personality
disorder diagnoses in everyday clinical settings ranged from 49% for antisocial per-
sonality to 1% for schizoid personality).
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So how does one decide when, if ever, psychiatric evidence
must be subject to hard scientific scrutiny and when, if ever, it
need only pass the general acceptance test or a similarly lax
standard? The proposal advanced here is that meeting the latter
test is sufficient for evidence that is material to past mental
states, but that Daubert's test must be met when psychiatric
evidence is used to prove any other type of issue (which will
usually involve whether a particular act occurred).
The rationale for this approach is, in the first instance,'62
based on necessity: while the phenomenology of physical acts
can be subjected to the scientific method-that is, use of con-
trolled populations, adequate samples, and meaningful criterion-
variables-past mental state cannot be. This is so for two rea-
sons. First, past mental states are not objective facts the exis-
tence of which can be proven in the same way the occurrence of
an act can be proven. Second, even if they are, obtaining useful
empirical information about legally relevant past mental states
is virtually impossible, or at least much more difficult than
studying the psychological correlates of actions.
The first assertion is based on the ideas of Professor Andrew
Taslitz.'63 Drawing on feminist literature and other sourc-
es,"4 Taslitz argues that we can never discover "objective
truth" about past mental states in the same way we can know
whether an event occurred.'65 We can "know" such mental
states only through acts of interpretation that inevitably differ
depending on a host of factors, including the identity of the
"observer" and the time at which the mental state is ob-
162. A deeper rationale for this approach is noted in the conclusion to this Article
and explored in detail in Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Sci-
ence in Criminal Litigation: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL. & L. (forthcoming 1999).
163. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence:
Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1998).
164. See, e.g., Susan J. Brison, Outliving Oneself- Trauma, Memory, and Personal
Identity, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF, 12 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1977);
JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1996); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE
(1997).
165. See Taslitz, supra note 163, at 78 (arguing that "mental states" are "interpre-
tive acts, not single, objective truths waiting 'out there' to be discovered").
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served.'66 Even the person whose mental state is in question, if
asked to report what it was at a particular point in time (the
type of report on which psychiatric evidence usually relies),
engages in interpretation.'67 As Taslitz notes:
Memory itself is an assertion, a self-report, which we play an
active role in constructing. Our memories never involve solely
historical truths, for we seek to create an account of the past
consistent with a preconceived cognitive or moral scheme.
Memory is thus at least partly a created narrative."
The difficulty of ascertaining past mental state is exacerbated
by the possibility that an actor may not "know" his mental state
even at the time it is occurring. As Taslitz puts it, "[wie may be
ambivalent, desiring and spurning simultaneously, leaving us
confused; we may deceive ourselves out of fear, guilt, or self-pro-
tection."'69 This may be particularly true in criminal situations
of the type normally the subject of psychiatric testimony, where
motivations, thoughts, and urges are likely to be jumbled togeth-
er rather than straightforward and logical.
When the factfinder is a third party rather than the subject,
the truth about mental states becomes even more contingent.
Triers of fact attempting to discern the individual's mental state
add their own interpretive gloss to the evidence presented. As
Taslitz states, "[wihen jurors name a mental state as 'premed-
itation,' "heat of passion,' or a 'belief in the imminent need to use
deadly force in self defense,' they are crafting an interpretation
that partly embodies their own assumptions, attitudes, and
beliefs." 7°
In short, while ascertaining objective truth might be possible
with respect to acts, "narrative thinking" dominates attempts to
reconstruct mental state.'7' Any description of mental state is
166. See id. at 12-27 (discussing mental state as an interpretive activity).
167. See id. at 19-20 (noting that "[mlemory is [ at least partly a created narra-
tive").
168. Id.
169. Id. at 24. Unconscious motivations are a particular problem. See MICHAEL
MooRE, LAW & PSYcHIATRY 374 (1984) (speaking of unconscious compulsion as an
"excuse in its own right").
170. Taslitz, supra note 163, at 26.
171. See id. at 34 ("It is narrative thinking that dominates our conceptions of the
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closer to a story than a depiction of an observable event. Science
cannot tell us the truth about past mental states because science
is meant to identify objective reality, not interpretations of
reality. At most, science can help us decide whether acts and
other types of more objectively discernable facts have occurred.
Even if, in theory, the existence of a particular mental state
can be scientifically proven, as a practical matter science will
often not be up to that task. This point can be illustrated
through explication of another recent work, authored by Profes-
sors Thomas D. Lyon and Jonathan J. Koehler.'72 Lyon and
Koehler argue that the probative value of a given type of expert
evidence can often be gauged by what they call the "relevance
ratio."'73 The "relevance ratio" is simply the ratio between the
proportion of cases in which a symptom is observed in the popu-
lation of interest and the proportion of cases in which the same
symptom is observed in the rest of the population.174 For in-
stance, assume that sixty percent of abused children suffer from
symptoms X, Y, and Z, and that thirty percent of children who
are not abused suffer from symptoms X, Y, and Z. The relevance
ratio in this case is 2:1 (sixty percent/thirty percent), meaning
that proof that a child has these three symptoms has significant
probative value on the issue of whether the child was abused.
Lyons and Koehler argue that the relevance ratio is "the most
efficient way to think about evidentiary relevance."'75 Assum-
ing that methodological problems do not render the information
relied upon invalid,'76 this assessment seems to be on target;
the ratio is an eminently sensible way of evaluating the proba-
self: 'Our plannings, our rememberings, even our loving and hating, are guided by
narrative plots.'" (quoting Theodore R. Sarbin, The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for
Psychology, in NARRATIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT 3,
11 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986))).
172. See Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating
the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 43 (1996).
173. Id. at 46-50.
174. See id. at 46-47.
175. Id. at 47.
176. Lyon & Koehler describe a number of methodological difficulties associated
with calculating the relevance ratio in a section entitled "Are All Studies Created
Equal?" See id. at 67-70.
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tive value of evidence. If the subject population is no more likely
to have the symptoms than the general population (i.e, the rele-
vance ratio is one or less), the evidence has no probative value
concerning the relationship of the symptoms to the subject popu-
lation. If the ratio is greater than one, the evidence has some
tendency to prove a fact at issue, the definition of relevance.'77
Relevance ratio analysis might prove very useful in conducting
the reliability assessment demanded by Daubert and Federal
Rule 401.
Consider, however, the difficulty of gathering information nec-
essary to calculate the relevance ratio where psychiatric evi-
dence about past mental state is involved. For instance, when
self-defense is asserted in a battered woman case, one would
need to determine the proportion of battered women who kill
their spouses believing they have no alternatives and the pro-
portion of nonbattered women who kill their spouses believing
they have no alternatives.178 Without any other information,
the most plausible conclusion is that, of the two groups, the
battered women are more likely to feel that they have no op-
tions. That kind of thinking, though, is not science; the scientific
method would require large enough samples of both groups
being compared and the development of reliable methods of
obtaining the relevant information about them.'79
177. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states: '"Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
178. In the literature discussing the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony,
one sometimes sees the following type of comment: BWS (or some other syndrome or
psychiatric claim) is not relevant because most battered women do not kill. See Ste-
phen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49
S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1259 (1976) ("[We must agree . . . that persons of low socio-
economic status probably find it easier than others to turn to violent street crime
for money, excitement, or release. Yet it is also true that the majority of poor people
are not violent criminals."). This type of argument has a superficial appeal: if most
battered women do not kill their batterers, most of these women must think they
have other options besides killing. Even if most battered women do think they have
other options, however, women who are battered may be more likely to feel that
they have no options than women who are not battered. That is the relevant legal
issue under a subjective self-defense test, and thus the correct comparison is the one
indicated in the text.
179. See, e.g., BARRY F. ANDERSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENT, AN INTRODUC-
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In conducting such research, one significant problem would be
ensuring that no other variables taint the comparison; that is,
the two groups should be similar in all significant ways except
with respect to whether they were battered. This problem, how-
ever, confronts any attempt to use the relevance ratio. 8 ' A sec-
ond problem, and one that is much more likely to afflict the
study of past mental state phenomena, is measuring the depen-
dent variable. Even assuming past mental state is an objective
"fact" rather than an interpretive story, how does one accurately
tell whether a female killer believed she had no alternative way
of avoiding serious physical harm at the time she killed? The
researcher can, of course, ask the woman whether she felt that
the killing was necessary. Even ignoring the possible inaccuracy
of self-serving statements made about an event that may have
occurred months ago, gauging the all-important variable-the
intensity of the woman's belief in the necessity of her ac-
tion-and then comparing it to the beliefs of other women is all
but impossible. As Stephen Morse has noted in a related context,
"[t]here is no scientific measure of the strength of urges."''
Similarly, there is no scientific measure of the strength of beliefs
that occurred at a specific point of time in the past.
Another example of the difficulty of calculating the relevance
ratio in a past mental state case comes from People v.
Gorshen.'82 In Gorshen, a psychiatrist testified that the defen-
dant killed his employer, with whom he had had an argument,
to avoid permanent insanity." A Daubert/relevance ratio cal-
culation in this case would require the impossible task of deter-
mining the proportion of people on the verge of psychic disinte-
gration who kill someone they dislike to the proportion of those
who choose to (or allow themselves to) disintegrate instead of
TION TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1971) (examining the requirements and proper use
of scientific method in psychology).
180. See Lyon & Koehler, supra note 172, at 67 (describing "selection bias" which
"occurs when the abused and nonabused children who are selected for study differ in
ways that may affect the variables measured in the studies").
181. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 584 (1978).
182. 336 P.2d 492 (Cal. 1959).
183. See id. at 495-96.
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kill the disliked person. Even if one could meaningfully define
"psychic disintegration," trying to find people who refrained from
aggressive action while on the verge of such disintegration
would be a fruitless endeavor.'4 If such people were found, one
would still need to measure the strength of the psychic pressure
they experienced, which, as Morse notes, is not possible.'
To put the point another way, even if research relevant to
past mental state can be characterized as "science," it is science
that is so likely to be tainted by methodological flaws that, in
effect, it is no different from interpretation and story-telling. In
contrast, research conducted to assist in proof of acts would not
need to determine the strength or existence of slippery phenome-
na like beliefs, emotions, or urges in the past. In the child abuse
example given earlier, the task would be to locate abused and
nonabused children and then catalogue their symptoms.'86 This
task is not easy, but it is certainly easier than ascertaining
whether spouse-killers felt they had alternatives or whether a
person on the verge of decompensation felt the need to kill.
Given the theoretical and practical difficulties in scientifically
proving past mental state, a Daubert analysis involving a rele-
184. Sir Karl Popper, the progenitor of the "falsiflability" concept given so much
play in Daubert, believed that one of the "best examples" of unfalsifiable theories
was Freudian thought, that the "psychodynamic" testimony in Gorshen reflects. See
Ralph Underwager & Hollida Wakefield, A Paradigm Shift for Expert Witnesses, 5
ISSUES IN CHILD SEX ABUSE AcCUSATIONS 156, 158-59 (1993).
185. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. The point here is that relevance
ratio analysis cannot profitably be carried out in this situation, not that the psychi-
atric testimony in Gorshen should have been admissible. For one thing, there is a
good argument that the testimony was immaterial, as it was proffered to show lack
of mens rea, to which volitional impairment is irrelevant. See Gorshen, 336 P.2d at
496. Second, it is not clear that the psychiatrist's theory of "psychic disintegration"
is one that would be plausible to other professionals (even those committed to psy-
chodynamic explanations), a test which, as argued below, must be met by any psy-
chiatric evidence. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
186. Note that in such cases the dependent variables-symptoms thought to be as-
sociated with abuse, such as anxiety or hyperactivity-might require an assessment
of mental state. This assessment differs from the BWS analysis in two ways. First,
what is being proven in court is still the act, an objective fact that can, at least in
theory, be proven scientifically. Moreover, the mental state information is more likely
to be ascertainable in practice as well, because the dependent variables involve as-
sessment of present mental condition that, albeit an interpretation, does not involve
the added interpretation required to remember a specific mental state.
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vance ratio calculation or some other scientifically-based tech-
nique should not be required in assessing the probative value of
psychiatric evidence on that issue. Rather, some version of the
general acceptance test should suffice. This test, as I would for-
mulate it, would still require psychiatric evidence on past men-
tal state to be based on a theory or concept that is plausible to a
significant number of professionals in the field.'87 Further-
more, the logic underlying the relevance ratio could still play a
role by framing the plausibility inquiry. For instance, testimony
on BWS probably should be admissible because a sizeable num-
ber of professionals now believe, although they can not "scientifi-
cally" prove, that women who are battered and kill their spouses
feel they have fewer options than those spouse-killers who are
not battered.'88 On the other hand, the theory that urban black
youths who kill other black youths fear their victims more than
other killers of black youth is less plausible (and, probably for
that reason, not well-accepted among professionals).'89 As Fed-
eral Rule 702 indicates, even if it cannot be called "scientific"
knowledge, psychiatric evidence about past mental state must at
least be "specialized" knowledge. 9 '
187. The test is formulated this way to avoid any connotation that the basis of the
testimony must be accepted as "science" or by most members of the relevant field;
the latter definitions might well be indistinguishable from Daubert's. Thus, for in-
stance, syndrome testimony that a sizeable number of professionals believe is based
on a plausible hypothesis would meet the suggested test, regardless of its scientific
validity, as would any opinion based on a diagnosis found in DSM.
188. See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) (noting that BWS "has
gained substantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility"); People v. Torres,
488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (same).
189. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at 73 (noting that "urban survival syndrome"
is not a medically recognized syndrome).
190. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Note that if, consistent with the arguments made in
this Article, past mental state evidence is seen as "specialized" knowledge rather
than "scientific" knowledge, the approach advocated here does not violate Daubert's
dictates, because a footnote in the majority opinion specifically avoided applying the
"falsifiability" requirement to "technical and specialized" knowledge. See Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8 (1993); see also Berry v. City of
Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 n.6 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting the Court's holding in
Daubert with respect to the applicability of Federal Rule 702 to technical and spe-
cialized knowledge); cf United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560, 568 (8th Cir. 1996)
(citing Richardson et al., supra note 99, at 10-11, for the proposition that "the na-
ture of certain social and behavioral science theories may be inherently inconsistent
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C. Helpfulness
Even if material and probative, evidence is not and should not
be admissible as expert opinion unless it assists the
factfinder."9' In theory, the easiest way to find out whether ex-
pert evidence helps the jury is to compare the accuracy of jury
decisionmaking with the expert testimony to its accuracy with-
out it. Studies comparing lay and expert decisionmaking on
questions like the accuracy of eyewitnesses or determinations of
abuse could be quite useful in this regard. Unfortunately, very
little research of this type has been conducted.'92 Furthermore,
here too there may be a distinction between evidence about acts,
as in the eyewitness and abuse examples just given, and evi-
dence about past mental states. Assessing the helpfulness of
expert testimony about the latter issue could be virtually impos-
sible in some cases, this time not because of the elusiveness of
past mental states, but because of the elusiveness of the doc-
trines to which they are relevant. For instance, if a jury and an
expert disagree on who is insane, how do we decide who is
"right ,?" 193
with Daubert criteria such as 'falsifiability' and 'error rates'"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
261 (1997).
191. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
192. See, e.g., Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror Common Understanding
and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 101, 115 (1988) (reporting on lay understanding of myths surrounding rape
cases and stating that "most of the comparable studies in the eyewitness area do
not . . . compare expert and nonexpert accuracy rates"). Research comparing lay and
expert predictions of dangerousness is also lacking. See Thomas R. Litwack, Assess-
ments of Dangerousness: Legal, Research, and Clinical Developments, 21 ADMIN. &
POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH 361, 373 (1994) (noting that whether 'mental health profes-
sionals have any special ability, not shared by laypersons, to assess dangerous-
ness . . . remains to be determined by future research").
193. Attempts to operationalize the extremely amorphous insanity construct have
met with limited success. Cf Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity,
Justification, and Culpability: Toward a Unifying Schema, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
447, 449, 463 (1995) (questioning the relevance of juror intuition about insanity to
the normative project of defining insanity). Expert/non-expert accuracy might be
more testable on some other issues of past mental state. See Frazier & Borgida,
supra note 192, at 111-15 (indicating significant accuracy differences between experts
and laypersons with respect to various aspects of rape, the latter of which might be
useful in drawing conclusions about whether intercourse was consensual).
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Accordingly, assessments of helpfulness today must usually be
based on a more seat-of-the-pants assessment. Testimony that
merely repeats what everyone "knows" is a waste of time and
perhaps even detrimental to the extent it becomes cast in stone
by the expert's words. On the other hand, testimony about acts
or mental states that is meant to rebut presumptions, overcome
statements or innuendo from the opposing side, or in some other
way provide counterintuitive or corrective information should be
considered helpful. A few examples of each of these situations
should suffice to make the point.
The criminal law presumes sanity 4 and permits an infer-
ence that one intends the natural and probable consequences of
one's acts.'95 These legal rules are based in part on normative
and procedural considerations, 9 ' but rely primarily on empiri-
cal assumptions that are probably right-most criminal defen-
dants are sane and most do intend the natural and probable
consequences of their acts. More importantly, these assumptions
are undoubtedly shared by most people, including the majority
of jurors and judges. Thus, any past mental state evidence of-
fered to the contrary ought to be considered helpful. Specifically,
probative testimony tending to support an insanity, provocation,
or lack of mens rea defense ought to be admissible because it re-
buts legal and lay preconceptions about mental state.
In other situations, it is a party, rather than the law itself,
that relies on commonly held assumptions. For instance, when
self-defense is the issue in a battered woman case, the prosecu-
tion might make much of the defendant's failure to leave a
194. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 154, §4.5(e) at 353 ("On the issue of lack of
responsibility because of insanity, the initial burden of going forward is everywhere
placed upon the defendant."); see also Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 470
(1895) (recognizing a presumption of sanity).
195. At one time a person was "presumed" to intend the natural and probable con-
sequences of his acts, but since Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), courts
are permitted to instruct juries only that they may draw an inference about intent
from behavior. See id. at 522-23. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 154, §
3.5, at 225-26 (discussing Sandstrom and personal intent).
196. For instance, the presumption of sanity has been described as a device for
saving "the state the fruitless trouble of proving sanity in the great number of cases
where the question will not be raised" and as "a description of the initial assign-
ment of the burden of producing evidence to the defendant." 2 McCoRMICK ON EVI-
DENCE, supra note 73, § 343, at 455 n.7.
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battering husband despite several apparent opportunities to do
SO."' In a child abuse or rape case, the defense might empha-
size the victim's failure to report the alleged offense immediately
after it "supposedly" occurred.19 In these situations as well,
probative psychiatric evidence about BWS, CSAAS, and RTS,
respectively, would be helpful because it would disabuse jurors
of the notions that most battered spouses leave their batterers
and that abused and raped victims usually report the assault
right after it happens. Even courts that are generally resistant
to syndrome testimony often permit it as rebuttal evidence in
such cases.199
Finally, there are situations in which no explicit statements
about behavior or mental state are made by either the law or
the parties, yet psychiatric evidence can be helpful because it
provides counterintuitive information. Determining when such a
situation exists can be difficult. Ideally, empirical information
indicating people's preconceptions about various issues would be
available,00 but even that can be misleading because stereo-
types change all the time and may differ between jurisdictions
or even juries. When in doubt, if the other evidentiary prerequi-
sites are met, the court should err on the side of admissibility.
197. See, e.g., People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (noting
prosecution argument that defendant "could have easily left" the abusive relation-
ship), overruled by People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996).
198. See, e.g., People v. Karst, 560 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (involving
victim's failure to promptly report the alleged rape).
199. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 20, at 2040 ("The overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions will allow testimony based on CSAAS when it is used to explain the
significance of the child complainant's seemingly self-impeaching behavior, such as
delayed reporting or recantation."); Fischer, supra note 20, at 713-17 (detailing cases
which allow RTS evidence "when it is used to rebut misconceptions about victim be-
havior"); Mosteller, supra note 141, at 479 ("When BWS is used for the purpose of
restoring the credibility of the defendant by countering prosecutorial impeach-
ment . . . the evidence, almost regardless of form, is readily accepted.").
200. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a
Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior? 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 15
(1982) (examining lay beliefs about potential eyewitness inaccuracy); Frazier &
Borgida, supra note 192, at 111-15 (reporting study comparing expert and non-expert
beliefs about rape); Gail S. Goodman et al., Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40
J. SOC. ISSUES 139, 142 (1984) (examining beliefs about the accuracy of child wit-
nesses).
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Consider psychiatric evidence that the defendant has a "pas-
sive" character, proffered to show that the defendant did not
commit the act charged. Because it does not involve proof of
mental state, it would first have to pass the Daubert/relevance
ratio hurdle (rather than the less onerous general accep-
tance/professional plausibility test).2"' If it does, it should be
considered helpful as well, since most jurors are likely to assume
that those who are charged committed the act. Although this as-
sumption may seem to run afoul of the presumption of
innocence," 2 that presumption, unlike the presumption of sani-
ty or the inference regarding intent, is not supported empirically
(most people charged are guilty) and is probably not believed by
most laypeople. By the same token, unless offered in rebuttal of
such evidence, proof that a person is not passive should not be
admissible because it would merely reinforce the widespread
assumption that a person charged with a crime committed that
crime. Such an outcome, of course, is consistent with the tradi-
tional character evidence rule barring proof of propensity by the
prosecution unless the defense "opens the door."
20 3
201. A relevance ratio analysis would require one to compare the proportion of
"passive" individuals who commit violent crime to the proportion of violent crime in
the general population. Assuming one could define "passive" in a meaningful and
nontautological way (avoiding what Professors Lyon and Koehler, supra note 172, at
68-70, have labeled "detection bias"), the proportion of violent criminals is likely to
be extremely low within both groups and it is not obvious that the passive group
would have the smaller proportion. Cf James M.A. Weiss et al., 2 A.M.A. ARCHIVES:
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 669 (1960). The authors state:
In general, the sudden murderers [i.e., persons who kill without any pre-
vious involvement in serious aggressive acts] demonstrated certain quali-
ties of the schizoid personality (emotional coldness and isolatedness, diffi-
culty in forming close relationships with other persons, and difficulty in
directly expressing hostility), and certain qualities of the passive-aggres-
sive personality (inefficiency, feelings of helplessness, and persistent reac-
tion to frustration with resentment).
Id. at 675.
202. As Professor LaFave points out, the presumption of innocence is not really a
presumption, in that it does not require proof of an underlying fact that then allows
the assumption of innocence. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 154, § 1.8(f), at 58.
Rather, it is designed to overcome, inter alia, the assumption that the "fact of accu-
sation is . .. evidence of . . . guilt." Id.
203. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (providing that "[elvidence of a person's character
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except . . . (1) evidence of a pertinent trait
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Psychiatric evidence about credibility of a witness can be ana-
lyzed in the same way. Because most people probably assume
that witnesses who are put under oath and testify under threat
of peijury will tell the truth, testimony suggesting otherwise
would be helpful, whereas testimony supporting truthfulness
would not be, unless offered in rebuttal."4 The more signifi-
cant hurdle for this type of testimony is whether it is probative.
Testimony about credibility usually concerns whether an act,
such as abuse, occurred, and thus, under the framework ad-
vanced in this Article, would have to meet the Daubert/relevance
ratio test.0 5
A more difficult case involves psychiatric testimony about so-
called "repressed memories," designed to bolster or attack testi-
mony from an alleged abuse victim about incidents often decades
old.206 Although jurors probably assume witnesses tell the
truth, they might also assume that an account of something so
long ago, the memory of which was just recently "discovered," is
not likely to be accurate. Accordingly, evidence about the re-
pressed memory phenomenon probably should be considered
helpful regardless of which side seeks to offer it;207 however, its
ultimate admissibility would depend upon whether it meets the
of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut same").
204. Cf FED. R. EviD. 608(a). The rule states that:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in
the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the charac-
ter of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or repu-
tation evidence or otherwise.
Id.
205. Under that test, the groups compared would be those with the witness's sa-
lient characteristics who lie in trial-like situations and those without those character-
istics who lie in trial-like situations.
206. See, e.g., Cole v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Services, Inc., 681 N.E.2d
1157, 1159-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting need for expert testimony to support va-
lidity of repressed memory testimony); J.G. v. Murray, 915 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.
1995) (involving testimony by defense expert attacking the reliability of repressed
memories).
207. See, e.g., Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D. Mass. 1996) (char-
acterizing repressed memory evidence as helpful); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F.
Supp. 1055, 1063-64 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (allowing expert testimony on repressed
memory).
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Daubert/relevance ratio test because it too is being used to prove
whether an act occurred."'
Helpfulness analysis is also important in determining the
form that psychiatric evidence may take. Such evidence can be
conceptualized as several-layered," 9 along the following lines:
1. Behavioral observations (e.g., the individual hears
voices when no one is talking);
2. Inferences or symptoms (e.g., the individual has hal-
lucinations);
3. Diagnosis (e.g., the individual has schizophrenia);
4. Application of the clinical information to the legal
issue (e.g., the individual was cognitively impaired at
the time of the offense);
5. Application of the clinical information to the ulti-
mate legal issue (e.g., the person was insane).21
Stephen Morse has argued that lay people will find only the
first level of information helpful because they do not need clini-
cal labels or expert speculations about degrees of impairment to
reach the moral judgments demanded by the law.21' Professor
Bonnie and I have countered that, with the exception of ultimate
issue testimony, informed speculation by mental health profes-
sionals can be of assistance on some occasions. 22 That debate
will not be rehashed here.21 3 Professor Morse is certainly right,
however, that courts allow a considerable amount of psychiatric
opinion testimony that is superfluous and unhelpful, regardless
of its probative value.
208. Research in this area may be difficult to assemble. See Ernsdorff & Loftus,
supra note 25, at 133 ("The traumatic nature of events that lead[] to.repression ...
virtually precludes experimental probing of the theory;, researchers have yet to de-
sign experiments that will enable them to study the repression and subsequent re-
trieval of a memory.").
209. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 13-17 (discussing the "several levels of
opinion that might be rendered" by mental health professionals).
210. See id.
211. See Morse, supra note 181, at 554-60.
212. See Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Pro-
fessionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L.
REV. 427, 452-466 (1980).
213. In addition to the articles cited supra notes 181 and 212, see MELTON ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 13-17.
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We did agree with Morse that, given its moral content, ulti-
mate issue testimony is not helpful and should be pro-
scribed.214 That position needs to be amended to recognize,
once again, the distinction between psychiatric evidence on men-
tal states and psychiatric evidence used to prove an act.215 "Ul-
timate" testimony as to whether someone is likely to have com-
mitted a particular act may well be helpful to the jury, in the
sense that the expert will know more about the correlation be-
tween certain symptoms and acts. Furthermore, such testimony
is not a moral judgment, but a statement of probabilities about
an objective fact. On the other hand, expert testimony that
someone is insane or acted reasonably in response to perceived
provocation is not only a value judgment, but, as stated before,
something that cannot be objectively verified.216 Thus, an
expert's view on this matter is no better than that of a lay per-
son who has been instructed on and follows the law.
217
D. Countervailing Factors
If expert evidence is material, probative, and helpful it should
usually be admissible. 8 As Federal Rule 403 recognizes, how-
ever, even evidence that meets these prerequisites might be so
time-consuming relative to its importance, so confusing, or so
likely to unfairly prejudice a party that it should be exclud-
ed.21 ' Generally, psychiatric evidence should not be excluded
for any of these reasons. It is likely to be important enough in a
given case to avoid exclusion on waste-of-time grounds, although
214. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 212, at 456-57.
215. Note that the relevant federal rule only prohibits ultimate issue testimony as
to "mental state or condition." FED. R. EVID. 704(b); see supra note 101 and accom-
panying text.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 162-87.
217. Although such testimony is thus not "helpful," it might be allowed for other
practical reasons, principal among them that it is so hard to avoid, at least in para-
phrase. As I have noted elsewhere, ultimate issue testimony in a truly adversarial
proceeding is probably harmless, even if it is not technically "expert." See Christo-
pher Slobogin, The "Ultimate Issue" Issue, 7 BEHAV. SC. & L. 259, 263-66 (1989).
218. See, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 73, at §§ 184-85, at 772-85 (discussing ad-
missibility of relevant (i.e., material and probative) evidence); id. at § 13, at 53-58
(noting admissibility of "helpful" expert opinion).
219. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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redundant or peripheral testimony might be censored.22 ° Fur-
ther, at least when compared to other types of expert evidence,
psychiatric testimony is unlikely to befuddle the average
jury."' Testimony about human behavior, even when put in
psychiatric terminology or expressed in terms of syndromes and
relevance ratios, is far more understandable than discussions of
physics, DNA analysis, and economic principles.222 Finally, for
much the same reason, psychiatric testimony is relatively un-
likely to carry undue weight, as most laypeople probably under-
stand that psychiatric evidence is more fallible than testimony
based on the "hard" sciences. 3
A few recurring scenarios might, however, pose a Rule 403
risk. First, testimony that merely bolsters strong preconceptions
might well unduly prejudice the party fighting the preconcep-
tion. For instance, evidence that a person charged with rape fits
a "rapist profile" reinforces the assumption of guilt and should
be excluded.22 4 Of course, such evidence might also be excluded
as inadmissible character evidence, as unhelpful, and perhaps
also because it lacks probative value. Some wily prosecutors,
however, may be able to evade the character evidence prohibi-
tion by characterizing the testimony as proof of intent or mo-
220. See, e.g., Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 137-38 (Wyo. 1991) (Urbigkit, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting discretion to reject redundant ex-
pert testimony).
221. See Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a 'Better Mousetrap,"
32 S. TEx. L. REv. 37, 66 (1990) (arguing that psychiatric testimony is probably "the
least over-awing" of the various type of expert testimony "because jurors have some
innate knowledge of human behavior").
222. Cf id. (noting that while jurors have "some innate knowledge of human
behavior," they are unlikely to have similar knowledge of physics, genetics, or aero-
nautics).
223. Certainly the popular press has not hidden its concerns about psychiatric evi-
dence. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The public itself has also demon-
strated a healthy skepticism about the objectivity and expertise of the mental health
professions. See Daniel Slater & Valerie P. Hans, Public Opinion of Forensic Psychia-
try Following the Hinckley Verdict, 141 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 675 (1984); see also Neil
J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Tes-
timony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 133, 173 (reporting research
indicating that jurors do not treat expert testimony on BWS, RTS, and eyewitness
reliability with an unwarranted aura of accuracy).
224. See Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828-29 (Fla. 1993) (holding testimony
based on "sex offender profile" inadmissible).
1998]
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tiv, 225 and might also be able to make a colorable argument
that any probative scientific evidence adds to the jury's knowl-
edge.22' Even if they can, they should not be able to get past
the Rule 403 hurdle.
A second situation in which the Rule 403 analysis should play
a role, likely to be more frequent, occurs when the psychiatric
evidence is only minimally relevant, either in the sense of being
of low materiality or of low probative value. For instance, gener-
al testimony about the inaccuracy of eyewitness identification
might be of relatively low materiality because of its lack of "fit"
with the case at hand.227 Yet jurors, impressed by the proba-
tive value of that evidence (which, given the strong research on
the subject, is very high), might nonetheless rely on the testimo-
ny as proof that no eyewitness can be trusted, a result some
courts have admitted they fear.228 This type of problem is like-
ly to occur frequently with social framework-type evidence,
where an almost inverse relationship between probative value
(i.e., validity) and case-specific materiality may exist. In such
situations, courts may not only need to evaluate the impact of
the psychiatric evidence by itself but also in conjunction with
other evidence. For instance, a judge might decide to exclude
generalized testimony about eyewitnesses if it is the only de-
fense evidence, but permit it if the defense also has a colorable
alibi claim.
Psychiatric evidence that is clearly material but has only min-
imal probative value might require similarly delicate balancing.
Imagine evidence of past mental state that is based on a barely
225. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts...
may ... be admissible [to prove] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . ").
226. See People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 401 n.32 (Mich. 1990) (noting expert
testimony should only be excluded "when it would add nothing at all to the jury's
common fund of information" (emphasis added)).
227. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985) (requiring a
showing that eyewitness identification testimony be sufficiently tied to the facts of
the case).
228. See, e.g., People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1165 (Ill. 1990) (upholding trial
court's exclusion of testimony on eyewitness identification because "[ilt would be in-
appropriate for a jury to conclude, based on expert testimony, that all eyewitness
testimony is unreliable").
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plausible theory, accepted by a sizeable group of professionals,
but also rejected by at least as many; or suppose that syndrome
evidence tending to show an act occurred exhibits a positive, but
very weak, relevance ratio. These types of evidence might justifi-
ably be excluded, despite passing the official threshold test for
probative value, because of their potentially untoward impact on
the jury."9 Unlike judges who have heard many cases involv-
ing expert evidence, juries do not have a comparison sample.
While jurors are not incapable of understanding that theories
are arcane or that a given relevance ratio is weak, they may
have trouble putting that information in context or gauging its
relative accuracy.
Of course, a functioning adversarial system may furnish a
significant corrective to these potential problems with the jury
by exposing the various flaws in psychiatric evidence just de-
scribed. Through cross-examination and rebuttal experts, law-
yers can expose the relative implausibility of a theory or its lack
of acceptance among other professionals, and explain a
syndrome's weak probative value.3 Accordingly, a third situa-
tion which merits close consideration under Rule 403 occurs
when the psychiatric evidence is not subjected to adequate ad-
versarial testing. Unchallenged, the usually minimal risk that
psychiatric theories, relevance ratios, and ultimate issue testi-
mony will overwhelm the jury's capacity to think for itself may
increase significantly. As one study concluded, "nonadversarial
expert testimony causes less systematic processing of ... expert
testimony." "I
Another reason for ensuring that psychiatric evidence is sub-
jected to adversarial testing is to prod the research community
229. Indeed, a barely positive relevance ratio might lead to "presumptive" exclusion.
After detailing methodological problems that could promote bias in studies comparing
abused and nonabused children, Lyon and Koehler state that "[blecause these biases
are difficult to eliminate ... courts should treat as presumptively irrelevant symp-
toms that are only slightly more common among abused children than among
nonabused children." Lyon & Koehler, supra note 172, at 70.
230. See, e.g., J.G. v. Murray, 915 S.W.2d 548, 549-51 (Tex. App. 1995) (involving
testimony by defense expert attacking the validity of plaintiff's repressed memories).
231. Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed Experts: The Impact of
Nonadversarial Versus Adversarial Expert Testimony, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451,
471 (1991).
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to perform better. Professor Faigman, among others, has argued
that one advantage of applying strict admissibility rules to psy-
chiatric evidence is that it would provide an incentive to improve
the product. 2 He contends that relaxed admissibility rules, of
the type advocated here for past mental state, are detrimental to
scientific progress because they put the courts' imprimatur on
the status quo.233 But gaining admission of evidence is only
winning the initial battle: the evidence must sway the factfinder
to win the war. To the lawyer-consumers of psychiatric evidence,
unfavorable verdicts, brought about by vigorous cross-examina-
tion and rebuttal evidence, should provide at least as much in-
centive to push for better research as would exclusion.234
The difficulty arises in determining whether such adversarial
testing will occur. Judges normally cannot foresee the adequacy
of a lawyer's preparation or his or her skill during trial. Even if
they could, a rule that evidence should be excluded because the
opposing side is too incompetent to combat it is paradoxical to
say the least.
Some steps are possible, however. Judges can conduct hear-
ings in limine to get a sense of whether evidence will be effec-
tively explored;23 if it appears the evidence will not be, they
can appoint their own expert to flesh out the issues. 6 Indeed,
the court might routinely appoint "expert experts" who can point
out the weaknesses (and strengths) of evaluation procedures and
research methodologies.3 7 The jury can be authorized to ask
232. See David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under
Daubert: Is It "Scientific," "Technical," or 'Other" Knowledge, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY
& L. 960, 971-77 (1995).
233. See id.
234. Note, for instance, that many of the novel defenses that have received press
attention, although presented in court using psychiatric evidence, did not prevail and
are seldom raised. See supra note 9. This is probably in large part because the
adversarial process exposes them for the junk theorizing that they are.
235. See Redevelopment Agency v. Tobriner, 264 Cal. Rptr. 481, 488 n.5 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (noting that "[c]ourts routinely conduct hearings in limine to determine
the scope of admissible evidence").
236. See E. Donald Elliot, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for
Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 501 (1989) (noting "inherent
power of a trial judge to appoint an expert").
237. See id. at 507-08 (recommending that the court appoint its own expert if it
finds expert testimony proffered by one of the parties would be subject to "substan-
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questions as a way of making up for attorney oversights." 8
Briefs on the scientific issues can be provided to the jury as
well. 9 Ethical rules, governing both mental health profession-
als24 and attorneys," can be enforced more vigorously against
incompetent, lazy, or pretentious individuals. In short, the judi-
cial system can develop effective ways of ensuring the factfinder
is not presented a one-sided or confused picture of the evidence.
One might argue that if good adversarial presentation of the
evidence could be guaranteed through these or other methods,
then courts should welcome even psychiatric opinions that have
little or no demonstrable probative value; after all, the reasoning
tial doubt in peer review by the scientific community"); cf Barrett v. Roberts, 551
F.2d 662, 671 (5th Cir. 1977) (suggesting that trial court on remand appoint an ex-
pert using Federal Rule of Evidence 706, which today authorizes court appointment
of experts who may be deposed by either party and called by either party or the
court). Many courts seem to believe that the best use of such court-appointed ex-
perts is to assist the judge in the gate-keeping function of determining whether the
evidence meets the Daubert or Frye test, rather than using them as independent
witnesses. See JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706
(Federal Judicial Center, 1993) (noting that a survey of all active federal district
court judges, with 80% responding, indicated that using Rule 706 experts as witness-
es in criminal cases was extremely rare).
238. See Hope Viner Samborn, Changing the Jury Tool Box: ABA Task Force In-
vites Criticism of Trial Proposals-And Gets It, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 22 (reporting
on the Civil Trial Practice standards drafted by the American Bar Association's Liti-
gation Section Task Force on Civil Trial Practice, which include a provision for per-
mitting jurors to submit written questions for witnesses). Under this provision,
"[a]fter receiving a question, the judge should disclose it to the attorneys and give
them an opportunity to object outside the presence of the jury. A cautionary instruc-
tion should explain, among other things, that some queries may be rejected or re-
written." Id.
239. Cf id. (noting proposal that judges distribute "jury notebooks" containing se-
lected admitted exhibits and other materials not subject to dispute).
240. See, e.g., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT §
1.04 (Boundaries of Competence); § 1.05 (Maintaining Expertise); § 7.02 (Forensic As-
sessments). Section 7.02(c) states that: "psychologists clarify the impact of their lim-
ited information on the reliability and validity of their reports and testimony, and
they appropriately limit the nature and extent of their conclusions or recommenda-
tions." Id. § 7.02(c).
241. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.1 (1996) ("A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."). Of course, defendants are also constitutionally entitled to effective
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
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might go, the weaknesses of such opinions can be uncovered by
the process. Adversariness that clarifies rather than obfuscates
cannot be guaranteed on a routine basis, however, and even if it
could be, knowingly giving the factfinder information that lacks
an indicia of reliability is antithetical to the ideal of a system
that purports to do justice. Thus, while a well-functioning ad-
versarial process may allow courts to be more flexible in their
admission of evidence than they would otherwise be, it should
not nullify the threshold requirements of professional plausibili-
ty for past mental state evidence and scientific validity for other
types of psychiatric evidence.
CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE CONCERNS
Courts are suspicious of psychiatric evidence that is nomothet-
ic in nature, departs from the traditional medical model, and
seeks to support doctrinally novel theories, and this suspicion
often exists without regard to or in spite of the evidence's reli-
ability. At the same time, courts unquestioningly accept tradi-
tional psychiatric evidence which may be just as unreliable, if
not more so. Furthermore, despite Daubert's purported
finetuning of the analysis, the judiciary has yet to devise a co-
herent framework for evaluating the admissibility of psychiatric
evidence it does suspect.
This Article provides such a framework. All psychiatric evi-
dence-traditional and nontraditional-should be subject to ad-
missibility thresholds, using the four-step analysis provided by
the Federal Rules of Evidence. First, the evidence must be mate-
rial, a requirement which may often necessitate a hard look at
the substantive law. Second, the evidence must be probative, a
maxim that should require that its basis be generally accepted
by, or at least plausible to, a significant number of professionals
if the evidence seeks to prove past mental state, and proven
through more rigorous scientific testing, using relevance ratio
analysis or similar methods, if it does not. Third, it must be
helpful, which means it should combat legal presumptions, com-
mon preconceptions, or claims by the opposing party. Finally, it
must be fairly and understandably presented as the tentative
information it is, which can usually be assured by adversarial
testing.
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As the alert reader has surely surmised by this point, the end
result of this approach is that defendants' psychiatric evidence
typically will be subjected to less judicial scrutiny than evidence
proffered by the prosecution. 2 The rationale discussed above
for this stance is a combination of necessity, given the difficulty
of proving past mental state, and helpfulness, given the natural
assumptions about past mental state that most lay people make.
Some might object that psychiatric evidence is never "necessary"
if it is of low probative value, and that it can never be "helpful,"
even when counterintuitive, if it leads to questionable find-
ings." 3 The better approach, on this view, is simply to rely on
lay rather than expert testimony and fact rather than opinion
when the issue is past mental state.
A deeper reason for nonetheless adhering to the framework
outlined here stems from democratic principles and the appear-
ance of fairness.' Our individualistic, pluralistic society es-
pouses a preference for allowing everyone to voice his or her
point of view. On issues about which there can be competing
versions of the truth, as with past mental state, litigants in
criminal trials should be able to tell their story. If telling that
story effectively requires an expert, the law should not stand in
the way. When the litigant is a criminal defendant, this stance
may even be constitutionally required. Under the Supreme
Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas, 5 we could not prevent
242. This is not always the case, however. For instance, prosecution evidence of
RTS, which focuses on the past mental state of consent, would be evaluated under a
general acceptance standard. Defense evidence that repressed memories are manufac-
tured, which focuses on whether an act occurred, would be evaluated under a
Daubert/relevance ratio analysis.
243. This, in short, is the primary objection of Professors Morse and Faigman. See
generally David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989) (arguing that
the value of social science is outweighed by its potential to prejudice jurors); Morse,
supra note 181, at 600-19 (arguing, inter alia, that mental health professionals
"should not be allowed to testify about theoretical matters that are in dispute or to
state conclusions that are not based on firm scientific evidence").
244. This argument derives from a discussion with Mark Fondacaro, Ph.D., Univer-
sity of Florida Department of Psychology. My thanks to him. The argument is devel-
oped further, in Slobogin, supra note 162.
245. 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (establishing criminal defendants' right to testify based on
the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, the Due Process Clause and the
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the defendant from taking the stand and describing his or her
version of the facts, so long as it stays within the bounds of the
substantive law. We should likewise be reluctant to prevent an
expert retained by the defendant from doing so."
There is a utilitarian side to this argument as well. The via-
bility of our criminal justice system depends in part on the per-
ception that it is willing to ascertain the truth.'1 If that sys-
tem prevents litigants from telling plausible stories based on
theories accepted by the relevant professionals, it may well un-
dermine the trust both of litigants and of society at large. 8
That result, to the extent it stems from the desire to enhance
reliability, would be ironic at best.
Fifth Amendment right to (decide whether) to remain silent).
246. The precise issue in Rock was the constitutionality of a per se rule barring
defendants from offering hypnotically-induced testimony. The Court required that
such testimony be permitted unless the state can show "that hypnotically enhanced
testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of
evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from presenting her version
of the events for which she is on trial." Id. at 61. Under this standard, not only the
defendant's own testimony, but most psychiatric testimony presented by the defense,
would be admissible. The Court's recent decision in United States v. Scheffer, 118
S.Ct. 1261 (1998), permitting an absolute prohibition on polygraph evidence present-
ed by the defendant, does not undercut this point. The Court distinguished Rock by
noting that a ban on polygraph evidence does not prevent the defendant from telling
his story about the crime, but merely bars the defendant "from introducing expert
testimony to bolster his own credibility." Id. at 1268-69.
247. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). Lind and Tyler note, for instance, that "[t]here is a
growing body of research showing that the experience of procedural justice not only
enhances evaluations of persons, institutions, and specific outcomes, but also leads to
greater overall satisfaction with the legal experience and more positive affect with
respect to an encounter with the justice system." Id. at 70.
248. Indeed, this concern might explain better than anything else why expert testi-
mony about battered women has been so widely accepted despite its scientifically
suspect nature.
